

# **AN INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT APPROACH FOR POLICING: THE CASE OF OPERATION GOOD - HOPE**

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**Assignment submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of Masters of Public  
Administration at the University of Stellenbosch.**



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## DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this assignment is my own original work and that I have not previously, in its entirety or in part, submitted it at any other university for a degree.

Signature : .....  
Romeo de Lange

Date : 18 December 2000

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## ABSTRACT

This study was embarked upon to identify an alternative approach to policing. It was an attempt to investigate whether an integrated development approach will be more successful in preventing crime and violence than heterogeneous police task teams and operations. Operation Good - Hope in the Western Cape, a SAPS crime prevention strategy to police the urban terror and related crimes (PAGAD and gang violence), was the focus of the study.

Plurality of research methodology was introduced to compile data. The data collected was analysed in relation to the topic and the objective of the study and to the research hypothesis.

Based on the data analysis the following are the main research findings:

- a working relationship existed between various SAPS components within Operation Good - Hope, but was not properly managed and coordinated;
- Operation Good - Hope did not allowed for external collaboration with relevant stakeholders and showed no sense of partnership;
- Operation Good - Hope did not police the social crime problems; and
- Operation Good - Hope was not shaped by a clear analysis and cohesive strategy.

The findings of the study gave rise to the following recommendations:

- That a local - based strategy for crime prevention be develop and lead by local government to normalise crime and violence;



- That a provincial framework be developed for an integrated development approach to police and stabilise serious violent crimes;
- That crime prevention solutions must be based on factors that causes crime; and
- A crime prevention strategy be designed and implemented.

Finally, the study indicates that provincial crime prevention strategies should be supplementary to local - based crime prevention strategies, to simultaneously stabilise and normalise crime and violence.

## OPSOMMING

Die studie is onderneem om 'n alternatiewe benadering tot polisieëring te identifiseer. Dit is ook 'n poging om uit te vind of 'n geïntegreerde ontwikkelingsbenadring meer suksesvol is as heterogene polisie taakspanne en operasies met die bekamping van misdaad en geweld. Operasie Goeie - Hoop in die Wes - Kaap, 'n SAPD misdaadvoorkoming strategie om stedelike terreur en verwante misdade (PAGAD en bende geweld) te polisieer, was die fokus van die studie.

Data was ingesamel deur middel van 'n pluraliteit van navorsingsmetodologie. Die ingesamelde data was geanaliseer in verhouding tot die tema, doelwitte van die studie en met die navorsingshipotese.

Gebaseer op die data analise, is die volgende die hoof bevindinge van die studie:

- Daar was samewerking tussen verskillende SAPD komponente betrokke by Operasie Goeie - Hoop, maar dit was nie deeglik bestuur en gekoördineer nie;
- Operasie Goeie - Hoop het nie voorsiening gemaak vir eksterne samewerking en vennootskap met relevante rolspelers nie;
- Operasie Goeie - Hoop het nie die sosiale - misdaad probleme gepolisieër nie; en
- Operasie Goeie - Hoop was nie bestuur deur 'n deeglike analise en deur 'n samehangende strategie nie.

Die studie het tot die volgende aanbevelings gelei:

- Die ontwikkeling van 'n plaaslike - gebaseerde strategie vir misdaadvoorkoming onder leiding van die plaaslike regering om misdaad en geweld te normaliseer;
- Die ontwikkeling van 'n provinsiale raamwerk vir 'n geïntegreerde ontwikkelingsbenadering tot polisieëring en om ernstige geweldsmisdade te stabiliseer;
- Dat oplossings tot misdaadvoorkoming gebaseer moet wees op faktore wat misdaad veroorsaak; en
- Dat 'n misdaadvoorkomingstrategie ontwerp en geïmplimenteer moet word.

Ten slotte toon die studie aan dat 'n provinsiale misdaadvoorkomingstrategie ondersteunend moet wees tot 'n plaaslike - gebaseerde misdaadvoorkomingstrategie, om te gelyke tyd misdaad en geweld te stabiliseer en te normaliseer.

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# **CHAPTER 1**

## **GENRAL OVERVIEW**

### **1.1. INTRODUCTION**

Crime and violence are complex and relate to multidimensional issues. To police crime and violence, in particular on the Cape Flats, calls for specific strategies. For several years the police have been fighting the crime and violence problem on the Cape Flats, but with few signs of success. In July 1996, the conflict on the Cape Flats reached a turning point, when alleged PAGAD (People Against Gangsters and Drugs) members killed Rashaad Staggie, a gangster and drug syndicate operator. His death led to the regrouping of gangs into the establishment of the Community Outreach Forum (CORE) to unite gangsters and drug dealers/ syndicates against PAGAD. Since then, violent conflicts of a criminal nature was the order of the day. The South African Police Service (SAPS) in the Western Cape Province initiated several crime prevention strategies. These attempts were a failure due to the lack of capacity to deal effectively with the complex problem.

The existing approaches to crime prevention are not adequate to address the current crime and violence problem in the Western Cape. A new way of looking at crime and crime prevention is required. What is needed are the following re - orientation and strategic shifts:

- a learning process and enabling setting where crime as a security issue becomes crime as a social issue;
- a participatory process through which crime control leads to a participatory crime prevention strategy;
- safety and security must be seen as an enabling and capacity building condition for economic growth and development; and




- the realisation that prevention is an essential precondition for the protection of individual rights and development of a sustainable society.

This study aims to provide stakeholders with an alternative approach to policing. The researcher is of the view that an Integrated Development Approach to crime prevention should be a specific function of policing. Currently, policing functions do not operate as an integrated force and there is no effective working relationship with other relevant government departments, non - governmental organisations and society at large.

According to the White Paper on Reconstruction and Development (1994), the South African economy was built on Apartheid and it enforced racial coexistence of population groups in every sphere of society. This resulted in South Africa being confronted by problems of economic, social, political, moral and cultural nature. The bitterness of the past and the inequalities created by Apartheid, were motivations for the reconstruction and development of South Africa's poor people. These problems were further causes of crime that are predominantly to be found in the disadvantaged communities within South Africa.

The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) need to be visible in all spheres of government and local communities. To relate the RDP to the prevention of crime and violence, the SAPS should not only look at the prevention of crime and violence, but it should be able to empower and build the capacity of communities to become self - reliant to the problems of crime.

**Figure 1:** *Policy framework of the South African Government to police crime and violence*



The South African Constitution of 1996 lays down that the South African Police Service has a responsibility to:

- prevent, combat and investigate crime;
- maintain public order;
- protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property; and
- uphold and enforce the law.

The aforementioned Constitutional (1996) mandate is further developed into the White Paper on Safety and Security (1998) that presents policy proposals for the SAPS to prevent crime and violence. The White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery (1997) provides the means of realising the objectives of the South African Constitution (1996), the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) (1996) and that of the broader community.



The White Paper on Safety and Security (1998) presents policy proposals intended to establish a stable and effective SAPS, capable of fulfilling its mandate to the people of South Africa. The White Paper suggests the development of an interdepartmental and multi - agency approach to crime prevention. The White Paper also addressess the responsibility of the broader society to work in cooperation with the SAPS to prevent crime. The National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) (1996) proposes an integrated approach to solving the crime problem in South Africa. This implies an integration of approaches between government departments and through partnership and mutual capacity building with non - governmental sectors and the broader community.

## **1.2. PROBLEM STATEMENT**

It has become a “standardised norm” in the SAPS to create task - teams and operations to deal with serious violent crimes, without evaluating the failures of such past initiatives (Arendse, 1998: 2). Operation initiatives in the SAPS has become heterogeneous and one - dimensional in its perspective. The researcher is of the opinion that no effective relationship was established both internally and externally in the SAPS as a strategic integrated approach to deal with crime and violence.

Crime prevention and efficient policing is one of the greatest challenges facing the South African Government and in particular the Western Cape. Urban terror/ violence has become a primary security threat on the Cape Flats. The seriousness of urban terror/ violence can be illustrated by the 624 incidents which occurred between 1 October 1997 and 31 August 1998 attributed to PAGAD and gang related conflict (Provincial Portfolio Committee Enquiry, 1998: 2). General crimes show an increase of 3,8% from 1 October 1997 (437 386) to 31 August 1998 (453 868). For the same period the majority of crimes (murder; attempted murder; robbery; housebreakings and theft of - and from vehicles) increased

except for rape and assault (Provincial Portfolio Committee Enquiry, 1998: 7). For the period 1998 to 1999, crime has increased with 55,24% (207464).

The character of policing serious violent crime in the context of operations culminated in a particular policing style. According to Arendse (1998) of Management Services, SAPS, Western Cape, the experiences of task teams and operations to policing, indicates that the SAPS has initially adopted a “watchman” style, with regard to managing crime in the province. This style of policing led to the situation where police tolerated and even ignored certain unconstitutional activities of both PAGAD and CORE. Arendse further argued that the escalating PAGAD/ CORE conflict, forced the SAPS to adopt a legislative style of policing, using legislation effectively to oppose bail for serious crimes. Through this a greater emphasis was placed on law enforcement. Currently, the SAPS adopted a “non - tolerance” approach which gives extra powers to the security forces. The researcher is of the opinion that the aforementioned approaches to policing, is still reactive and one - dimensional in dealing with the violent crime crisis in the Western Cape.

The RDP was designed to realise achievable, sustainable, improved standards of living and to create a stable society characterised by equitable economic growth. The RDP identified the following six (6) principles: integration and sustainability, people drivency, peace and security, nation building, meeting basic needs and building infrastructure, democratisation, assessment and accountability. The RDP envisages a *social partnership* and the government should therefore provide services and support to all sectors of society.

Kotze (1997: 36) shifts the emphasis in development to people and to the enhancement of people’s capacity to participate in their own development processes. Through people - centred development, creativity is initiated and capacity building take place. The participation of people in development will help



them to become self - reliant in their own development processes.

In 1996, the government adopted the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS), which provided a framework for a multi - dimensional approach to crime prevention. It provided means by which government departments could integrate their approaches to problems of crime prevention. The aims of the NCPS is to reduce the level of crime and violence in South Africa through:

- a comprehensive policy framework;
- generating shared understanding of what crime prevention involves;
- policy objectives should provide guidelines for programmes to be initiated by government and NGO's;
- develop a common vision for crime prevention;
- mobilising key government resources in an integrated way towards crime prevention;
- creating a sense of confidence that crime will be reduced; and
- maximising participation in the crime prevention arena (NCPS, 1996: 5).

These underlying principles are the foundation of the RDP and the building blocks of development.

At the SAPS there should no longer be isolation between planning, development and implementation of solutions. Strategic approaches in the SAPS should be incorporated to set clear guidelines for policing. Approaches to policing should be in cooperation and in the interests of the community in order to establish a partnership between the police, community based organisations and NGO's.

The researcher is of the opinion that in the Western Cape different police components, various security and law - enforcement services (like the Justice Department, Defence Force and Correctional Services) perform their distinctive tasks in a heterogeneous manner. Policing structures, including Non -

governmental organisations (NGO's), community anti - crime structures, neighbourhood watches and Community Police Forums (CPF's), does not function as an integrated model accommodating the principles of the building blocks of development in pursuing the ideals of the White Paper on Safety and Security (1998).

### **1.3. HYPOTHESIS**

Although there is an inter - working relationship between security forces in the form of operations, the researcher assumes that the security forces (police, army, justice) fail to understand how their integrated tasks/ roles should supplement each other. Furthermore, this operational method of managing serious violent crime, does not address the empowerment of communities in order to minimise the activities of serious violent crimes in relation to the values of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (1994), the NCPS (1996) and the White Paper on Safety and Security (1998).

According to Bless and Higson - Smith (1995: 38), a hypothesis must be conceptually clear, must be specific, should have empirical referents and must be testable with available techniques. The study supports Bless and Higson - Smith (1995: 38), that no hypothesis can be formulated and no problem resolved unless a clear analysis of all variables has been performed.

It is hypothesised that an Integrated Development Approach will be more successful in preventing crime and violence than heterogeneous police task teams and operations. An Integrated Development Approach will enhance participation and partnership between government departments, non - governmental organisations and society. It will be an integration of different skills, capacity, role - players and will empower, and entrench public participation in crime prevention processes.



Based on the theory of Brynard and Hanekom (1997: 20), the study is interested in the following variables:

- (i) **Independent variables**
  - Integrated Development Approach
  - One - dimensional Approach
- (ii) **Dependent variables**
  - successful crime prevention

The measurement of performance (dependent variable) are determined by the above independent variables

#### **1.4. JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY**

This is an important study because the issues raised and recommendations formulated can lead to a mind - shift from traditional policing to a policing in change.

This study is designed to be the subject of an appropriate development strategy for policing in taking forward the principles of the White Paper on Safety and Security (1998), the National Crime Prevention Strategy (1996) and the Reconstruction and Development Programme (1994).

It is hoped that this approach will provide an alternative to the current method of policing serious violent crimes in the Western Cape. The study attempts to integrate functions of various police structures, inter - government departments, NGO's and community based anti - crime structures.



The researcher is of the opinion that the study is justified and necessary in that it attempts to develop a constructive alternative model for policing the current complex violent crime situation in the Western Cape, and provide guidelines for solutions in this regard, in relation to the values of the RDP (1994) and the Constitution (1996), the White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery (1997) and the White Paper on Safety and Security (1998).

The study offers the possibility to stimulate further research on issues relating to joint approaches by stakeholders in developing strategies to effectively police and combat crime and violence in the Western Cape and South Africa as a whole. The study will determine the importance of an integrated approach to police serious violent crime as a specific function of operation activities. The study also investigates the success/ and or failure of Operation Good - Hope.

A study regarding integrated approaches were conducted, focussing on the elements of an integrated approach, how it works and its successes. The elements of and integrated approach is used to conduct an analysis of the functioning of Operation Good - Hope, particular focussing on the successes and failures of it.

## **1.5. THE RESEARCH SCOPE: OPERATION GOOD - HOPE (SAPS)**

On 12 January 1999, Operation Good - Hope was launched by the former SAPS Commissioner, Commissioner Fivaz, to establish a capacity to fight urban terrorism and related crimes in the Western Cape. The launch of Operation Good - Hope followed after an increase in the number of urban terrorism and related incidents were experienced in the Western Cape. This included pipe bomb attacks on, amongst others, police stations, drive - by shootings and murders involving high profile individuals. Operation Good - Hope operated on three dimensions, namely, operational, investigation and intelligence.

Operation Good - Hope has become a top priority for policing and every possible resource are being made available. It is expected to run a bill of R 4,3 million a month. Plans for operations are done secretly and only top police structures are aware of the plans.

The original head of Operation Good - Hope was Assistant Commissioner Daniels and Director Mpembe (now Deputy Provincial Commissioner – Gauteng). They reported directly to the National Commissioner of the SAPS, former Commissioner George Fivaz. Staff for Operation Good - Hope included special task force members that were responsible for operations, detectives from Murder and Robbery branches, and senior officers from the Defence Force.

Within Operation Good - Hope, more emphasis were placed on the use of crime intelligence. It was a joint operation between the SAPS and the Defence Force. Operation Good - Hope was based at Bishop Lavis, in the centre of the Cape Flats and urban terror.

## **1.6. METHODOLOGY**

### **1.6.1. The research design**

According to Garbers (1996: 278), the research design is important to plan and structure the research in such a way that valid findings can be generated. It also enables the researcher to determine what means are to be used to obtain the necessary information.

According to Bless and Higson - Smith (1995: 63, 67), the research design “can be understood as the planning of any scientific research from the first to the last step ... an overall strategy by which questions are answered or hypothesis are tested”.



The researcher considered the applied research to be appropriate. The research is historical, analytical and correlational (Brynard and Hanekom, 1997: 5, 6). The research methodology is based on quantitative (testing theories, determining facts and demonstrating relationships between variables) and qualitative research (develop theories and understanding and promote better self - understanding and increase insight) (Garbers, 1996: 282, 283).

The applied research method is undertaken to ensure that the research results can be applied to solve an immediate problem (Brynard and Hanekom, 1997: 5).

### **1.6.2. Study site and study participation**

The study is documentary based on the applied research method, limiting itself to develop new approaches to policing violent crimes on the Cape Flats. The study was conducted in the study site, Operation Good - Hope, a policing approach to deal with urban terror on the Cape Flats in the Western Cape Province. The study site is conducted in comparison with the theories on integrated approaches. The description of the study site is presented in paragraph 1.6.1.

### **1.6.3. Sampling and sampling procedures**

Considering time limitations and the nature of discussions involving approaches to crime prevention, respondents were chosen selectively representing various security agencies, institutions and organisations dealing with crime prevention.

Personal interviews were conducted with eleven stakeholders, who were either directly or indirectly involved in Operation Good - Hope, and with those who were not involved but who had a direct interest in the activities of Operation Good - Hope, in order to yield the research suitable for statistical analysis.

#### **1.6.4. The instrument**

Data was gathered by using the following plurality of research methodology (Bless and Higson - Smith, 1995: 25, 105, 107, 113):

- i. A comparative literature review to:
  - sharpen and deepen the theoretical framework of the study;
  - familiarise the researcher with the latest developments in the area of study;
  - identify variables that must be considered in the study, as well as those that prove irrelevant; and
  - identify gaps and knowledge, as well as weaknesses in previous studies.
- ii. Mind mapping was done on relevant unpublished documents related to the study field. Through this the researcher found information and personal experience not been published in scientific literature.
- iii. The researcher is a participant observer in the study site of this research. The researcher gained deeper insight into the research problem and enjoyed the confidence of participants.
- iv. A formal structured thumb - press interview schedule (Schutte, 2000) that consisted of open - ended questions surrounding perceptions, relations, skills and expertise and evaluation about Operation Good - Hope was used. The thumb - press interview schedule made it easier for the researcher to leaf through pages while interviewing respondents. Questions were also explained to the respondents. Through the aforementioned structured interview, the researcher was able to have direct personal contact with the participants. Respondents were able to



express their views broadly on a certain issue, and can freely expand and relate to their own experiences.

- v. Informal focus group discussions were conducted with people involved in similar subject issues, through informal gatherings, i.e. lunch breaks, social - and office meetings and through attending community activities. In this case, the researcher did not expose the purpose of engaging colleagues in informal discussions about the study field. The researcher engaged with informal discussions with people to accumulate their experience from which the researcher can learn, deepen understanding and open new perspectives.

And example of the formal structured thumb - press interview is attached as **Appendix 7.1.**

### **1.6.5. Analysis of data**

According to Brynard and Hanekom (1997: 48), a researcher has to determine and select from a general field that data which is required for the research project. The data collected was filtered in relation to the topic and objective of the study and to the research hypothesis. The views of different authors were integrated and the basic elements of data analysis followed, as stipulated by Brynard and Hanekom (1997: 54-55). These include:

- identify views, explanations and definitions which could be regarded as applicable to the research;
- identify reconcilable and complementary concepts from the views of the different authors studied;
- identify key concepts from selected views, explanations and definitions;
- by using either the reconcilable or the contradictory concepts, or both,



and formulate own viewpoint;

- determine the number of authors studied who put forward reconcilable – and opposing concepts;
- continuously apply the double - barrelled questions; and
- base conclusions on findings and answers to the double - barrelled questions.

## 1.7. CLARIFICATION OF KEY CONCEPTS

In order to facilitate clarity, the researcher has made an effort to explain the following concepts in the context of the study:

**Participation:** Participation as a concept is an integral part of social development. For the purpose of the study, participation is seen in the context of making joint decisions between all relevant role players. Through participatory decision - making, it creates a sense of community, it builds organisations and strengthens capacity and gives ultimate control (Midgley, 1986: 3).

**Urban terrorism:** Urban terrorism is a crime tendency involving the perpetration of stealth assault attacks against civilian or statutory targets by armed groups, or such extensions of civil society organisations, as means to either intimidate or eliminate whom or what such group believes to be their opposition within an urban and/ or pre - urban geographical context. (See Provincial Committee Enquiry, unpublished report, 1998: 3).

**Integrated approach:** This term is a matter of methodology. The basic underlying the integrated approach (within the research context) is that all relevant role players involved in the prevention of crime can and must contribute effectively to the development of policing. The integrated approach is a new approach to the current style of policing. (See Kotze, 1997: 41).

**Development:** According to Hettne in (Burkey, 1993: 33) there is no specific or fix definition of development, and that development can only be applied in a particular context. Within the context of the research, development is about specific skills, knowledge and experiences integrated and learnt by people who benefit from the work required. Development refers to participation, empowerment, self - reliance, capacity - building, social learning, sustainability and democracy. (See Esman, 1991; Korten, 1990; Gran, 1983; Coetzee and Graaff, 1996).

**Policing:** For the purpose of the study, policing refers to the SAPS concerned with the maintenance of public order and enforcement of laws.

**Crime prevention:** Crime prevention keeps crime from happening, thus rather focusing on pro - active policing than re - active policing.

**Traditional approach:** For the purpose of the study, the traditional approach refers to the one - dimensional approach to policing which puts more emphasis on planning than on implementation. It lacks the capacity of infrastructure and integration between various role players.

**Change in approach:** Change in approach refers to an integrated approach to participation, empowerment, planning techniques, more emphasis on implementation and on monitoring and evaluation.

**RDP:** For the purpose of the study, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (1994) will be used to integrate strategies to harness available resources in a coordinated way to achieve objectives. The RDP promotes peace and security and requires the participation of all people in South Africa.

**Task Teams:** A temporary grouping of specialists for the purpose of



accomplishing a definite objective.

**Operation:** A military action with a mission of accomplishing a definite objective.

**Batho Pele:** Refers to the White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery (1997), and means “People first”. It also has 8 guiding principles for better public service delivery and work ethic.

## 1.8. FRAMEWORK OF STUDY

The study project consist of four chapters. Chapter 1 provides the introduction and hypothesis, purpose and methodology of the study. The literature review is covered in Chapter 2. This chapter reviews the theoretical perspectives on Integrated Development Approaches. Chapter 3 looks at crime prevention of serious violent crimes, with Operation Good - Hope as a case study. Chapter 4 presents an analysis of data and main findings. The final chapter deals with policy recommendations and a conclusion.

## 1.9. ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS

Subject to the question of ethics, certain information regarding the SAPS requires confidentiality. Most operations in the SAPS are conducted with secrecy in order to ensure the successful arrests of criminals. However, this kind of secret information was not needed for the purpose of this study. The study was interested in collecting information on the structural approach of operations within the police.

Permission and consent was obtained from the participants for the interviews with an explanation that the study was for study purposes and that the study findings

can be made available to assist with the SAPS strategies to crime prevention.

Appointments were made in advance with each respondent as to time and venue convenient to him/ her (Brynard and Hanekom, 1997: 33). Due to the sensitivity of the work of respondents interviewed, the study does not directly quote information gathered from the respondents. However, respondents are registered as references under the bibliography for the purpose of the study.

## **1.10. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY**

The limitation relates to the sample size via the selected interviews. The data results collected through the sampling size may not be generaliseable to a larger population. The number of people interviewed were small, therefore the non - responses are more than in a survey. The researcher targeted twelve people to be interviewed of whom eleven participated. The respondent not interviewed was identified by the researcher as a key source of information. Four attempts were made by the researcher to secure an appointment with the respondent outstanding, but was unsuccessful.

The researcher also unsuccessfully attempted to convene focus group discussions with three different homogeneous groups of minimum seven participants each. The three respective homogeneous groups identified were:

- Manenberg community in the Cape Flats, who is affected by the gang - and PAGAD related violence;
- Business people from the Central Business District in Cape Town and immediate surrounding areas. These business people were affected by the acts of urban terror, i.e. bomb explosions; and
- Police officials who were responsible for the execution of the function of Operation Good - Hope.



Arrangements were done to meet with focus groups. The number of participants who turned - up did not meet the requirements to constitute a formal focus groups discussion (Bless and Higson – Smith, 1995: 106-107). Feedback received from the participants (focus group) indicates that the following are possible factors which contributed to the focus group discussion not materialising:

- Fear of exposing their identity; and
- Fear to comment on PAGAD and gang related violence.

It took a long process for the researcher to set - up meetings with the interviewees, due to their tight work schedules. The limitations of the study, the researcher argues, stand in relation to the problematic nature of the research topic.

## CHAPTER TWO

# THEORETICAL OVERVIEW OF THE INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT APPROACH

### 2.1. INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter it has been argued that there is no effective working relationship between stakeholders, and that an integrated development approach to crime prevention should be a specific function of policing.

This chapter focuses on various theoretical perspectives regarding integrated development approaches. The researcher through the various theories on integrated development first defined the concept of “*integration*” and how it relates to development and planning, secondly looks at different models of integrated approaches and thirdly provides examples to illustrate theories on integrated approaches.

The SAPS have always been a site of struggle during the Apartheid era that complicated the task of developing a shared vision of democratic policing, (Stevens and Yach, 1995: 2). The vision of democratic policing to which Stevens and Yach refer, look at openness based on trust and respect which is essential for community policing. Society will give general support for a police service that is accountable, people – centred, fair and non – discriminative, consultative, participative and have visible presence.

The need for a vision of democratic policing can be found in a coordinated approach to crime prevention. It allows for the development of a co - operative interaction of various role players. It will reorientate the SAPS away from “*incident – led*” activities towards a problem solving approach to crime prevention. A problem solving strategy requires the SAPS to look beyond a particular offence to consider its precipitating causes/ shift from reactive to a proactive policing.



Throughout the following paragraphs the researcher integrates various theories on integrated approaches to support arguments in favour of a coordinated/ integrated development approach to crime prevention.

## **2.2. THE INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT APPROACH**

### **2.2.1. Defining integration**

There is a widespread use of the concept “*integration*”, without understanding what it means, (Condè et al, 1979: 15). Condè et al argues that this can result in the concept been differently utilised to methods of planning and implementation, and not enough progress been made in integrating the organisational goals with policies.

The concept requires the involvement and effective contribution of all role players towards a particular/ specific process. For example the development and implementation of a crime strategy to reduce the level of gang activities should include the participation of the SAPS, external organisations (such as business, non - governmental organisations and community based organisations) and Community Police Forums that represent the affected communities. Applying an integrated approach (within this regard) does not only refer to liaison or meetings between role players/ organisations. Account needs to be taken of how the various contributions of each role player/ organisation can contribute their expertise, knowledge and resources towards a particular process. Managing these integrated contributions is of importance in order to reach specific objectives.

The goal of the integrating aforementioned role players/ organisations for a particular process is to develop joint approaches around problem areas, and to develop a satisfactory example of cooperation and coordination. According to Condè et al (1997: 17), in such an approach it is possible to bring about conditions favourable to self - sufficient development. The logic of integration is to avoid the isolation of participants, organisational capacity, expertise and resources in specific development processes.

According to Hopkins (1937: 1), “Integration refers to continuous, intelligent, interactive adjusting... interrelated... ongoing...improving.” You are constantly in the process of interacting with the environment. The following table (**Table 1**) adapted from Hopkins (1937: 3), illustrates the differences between integration and disintegration:

**Table 1:**      *Integration vs Disintegration*

<b>Integration</b>	<b>Disintegration</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Wide contact with the environment</li> <li>• Approaches problems with confidence, courage, hope, optimism</li> <li>• Find solutions for problems</li> <li>• Draws relevant conclusions</li> <li>• Puts into practice the conclusions</li> <li>• Uses feelings either as instruments or ends as compatible with the preservation of wholeness</li> <li>• Organise pertinent aspects of successive experiences to be available for use in practices.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Moves in a narrow environment</li> <li>• Attempts to escape problems</li> <li>• Meets only those problems from which there is no escape with a feeling of inferiority, inability to solve the problem and lack of confidence</li> <li>• Find solution to problems more emotionally than thoughtfully</li> <li>• Draws highly irrelevant conclusions with increasing frequency</li> <li>• Reviews and modifies conclusions without the addition of a new and pertinent data</li> <li>• Acts with undue caution and restraint in translating conclusions into overt behaviour</li> <li>• Accepts the consequences of behaviour unwillingly when the invalidity or irrelevancy of conclusions has been established</li> <li>• Withdraws to greater degree from the environment</li> </ul>

The integrated model makes contact with the environment. It resolves problems by the best thinking available, thereby building dynamic drives and cumulative techniques for use in examining experience. The disintegrated model tries to escape meeting the problems with limited movement in the environment. It responds more emotionally than thoughtfully to problems, therefore becomes more uncertain and hesitant.



### **2.2.2. Defining development**

According to Hettne in Burkey (1993: 33), there is no specific definition of development. Development can only be defined in a particular context or reality. Development involves structural transformation, which implies inter alia political, social and economic changes.

Bryant and White (1982: 14-20) see development as paying attention to capacity, involving equity which creates empowerment and ensure a sustainable future.

Stewart in Kotze (1997: 4–6) defines development as the building of specific skills, knowledge and experiences learnt by people who benefits from the work required. He further argued that development couldn't take place when development action does not hold the views of people affected. Therefore development refers to participation, involvement, empowerment, self – reliance, capacity – building, social learning, sustainability, democracy and people. Kotze (1997: 36) refers to development as a people - centred approach, where people and their environment are primary considerations in development. (See Esman, 1991; Korten, 1990; Coetzee and Graaff, 1996).

According to the RDP (1994: 8–9), development is a people driven – process. Development is not simply the rendering of services, it is about active participation and enabling people to help themselves. The promotion of peace and security requires the participation of people.

Burkey (1993: 50) argues that development should embrace self - reliance, where people learn how to form and manage their own organisations, maintaining self - confidence, making independent decisions and learn how to acquire and adopt new knowledge and technologies. Burkey (1993: 56) argues that the essence of development is when people learn to take charge of their own lives and solve their own problems.

### 2.2.3. Defining an Integrated Development Approach

According to Weitz (1979: 23), “Integrated development is a program for the simultaneous execution of multi – purpose planning activities.” Weitz refers to co-ordinated planning of activities, which will compose concrete projects for implementation. Individual and or isolated projects within an organisation could have duplicative affects, and multiplication of tasks that can lead to the inability of providing goods and services at the end of the project.

Implementing an integrated approach is to make sure that the outputs of an objective has been reached successfully. In order to have the ability of providing the output, an organisation’s administrative capacity and operating of resources needs to be linked to its integrated approach of managing a programme or a project. Weitz (1979) emphasises the importance of managing an integrated development programme. This also include the required administrative capacity, resources and personnel satisfaction. The sustainability of a particular process is important. The advantage of the integrated development approach, is that:

- services which function on a similar scale will be located in a single place;
- an organisation will be able to obtain most needs in one place;
- there is an inter – cooperation of various activities;
- it can attract different skilled personnel;
- it is a participative approach of mutual learning and contributing knowledge;
- it controls interaction of responsibilities and task related roles; it identifies tasks at the level they occur; and
- is a bottom – up approach.

Jackson (1994: 26) explains *system thinking* as an approach to resolving problems within a holistic framework, rather than reducing the problem situation to its parts and trying to understand them as separate entities. Kotze (1997: 66-67) supports Jackson, by arguing that the emphasis in holistic thinking is on a process, relationships and interactions. In this way each person builds up ideas of other people, and each person’s actions and reactions is inter



- connected with the ideas of other people. Using systems thinking means understanding things within an integrated approach and holistic, trying to view things simultaneously and collectively. With system thinking as an integrated approach, we learn about and clarify different ideas or viewpoints on activities and functions. It creates the opportunity to develop a “unitary relationship” where values and interests are shared. However, the “unitary relationship” becomes more difficult to manage, as a complex divergence of values and interests are created. From an integrated perspective, one can optimise the various contributions (interests and values) to the achievement of a fixed goal.

The idea is to abandon a single objective model of a problem situation and to work on a variety of objective models. The concern highlighted by Jackson (1994: 28) is to accept cultural differences and to develop a learning process in which the various participants in a problem situation can appreciate each other's contribution and be committed to a particular course of action, and may still hold their different values. Kotze (1997: 43) explains the *learning - process approach* as a bottom - up mode of decision - making and partnership, where people are included in the learning process of development. Korten (1983: 213) supports Jackson (1994) and Kotze (1997), by identifying the following three elements which are important in the learning - process approach:

- The people and the programme: The needs of the people and the prospective output to be delivered by the programme have to be attained to one another.
- The people and the organisation: The way in which the people formulate needs and demands and the decision - making process of the organisation should be adjusted to one another.
- The programme and the organisation: The objectives of the programme have to be in keeping with the capacity of the organisation.

Both Weitz (1979) and Jackson (1994) see integrated development as a system of relationships within a specific framework of operation. What is important



about these relationships, is the “cross – functions” of activities supplementing each other and its dependency on other resources.

The active participation of relevant stakeholders (in particular communities) in the development process is a crucial factor in the integrated approach.

Programs can have disappointing results, if they are imposed on the people from outside and fail to win their cooperation and support. De Beer and Swanepoel (1998: 23-34) argue that those affected by development should be the main players and decision – makers in the process. A program will only be acceptable if those affected get involved.

The White Paper on Local Government (1998) requires municipalities to promote integrated spatial and socio - economic development that is socially just for everyone in the community. This should imply that crime prevention principles are integrated with other aspects of local development.

The Local Government Transition Act (1993) compels municipalities to develop negotiated integrated development plans (IDP's). IDP's aim to integrate the development and management of the area under the jurisdiction of the municipality. The plans incorporate land - use planning, transport planning and the promotion of integrated economic development. IDP's is a form of development where different action support and augment one another by setting up positive interrelationships. (See the White Paper on Local Government, 1998: 47-53).

What is important for the purpose of the study, is to know what IDP's mean for crime prevention? IDP's has been designed to ensure that those people who are affected by these plans should have a say in their development. What people consider as priorities should be reflected in these plans. A community crime prevention plan provides a basis for these priorities to be addressed. It takes into account community needs.

IDP's ensure a coordinated use of government resources to address disparities in the communities access to employment, services and wealth creation, which are essential parts of crime prevention.

## **2.3. THEORIES ON THE INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT APPROACH**

### **2.3.1. Integrated development and planning**

“The separation between plan formulation and implementation has rendered many plans to be mere statements of intent covering ambiguous objectives without engaging in specific implementation strategy”, Goodman and Have (1980: 5). The emphasis is on linking the plan formulation with the implementation strategy. According to Condè (1979: 18), this can only be realised once there is an integration of objectives and structures within an organisation.

Setting crime prevention goals without regard to the concerns of the broader community and involvement of relevant stakeholders, very often results in a crime prevention situation being created which is not geared for safer communities, and which can subsequently cause people to become more negative to police methods of policing and taking the law into their own hands. The integrated approach promotes teamwork, coordination of decision – making and implementation of strategies. Motivation is created and issues are identified in a participatory and multi – disciplinary manner.

The underlying principle with structures is to achieve functional integration between administrative and technical bodies and stakeholders involved in the planning and implementation of strategies. What is important here is to evaluate how structures can constitute a coherent system and become adaptive to the implementation of a multi – sectoral programmes. The integration of structures into strategic planning, creates a functional coordination and liaison between stakeholders, and identify what is needed to obtain a better circulation of information, effective decision – making and joint management of resources. The latter argument will redefine each stakeholder involved in development to contribute all their abilities and potential in terms of the resources, techniques, services and know – how required to implement an integrated policy.



Schutte (1981: 6) defines strategic planning as the process of deciding on the mission and objectives of the organisation. This include the resources to be used in attaining these objectives and guidelines and policies that are to govern the organisation's planning process.

**Table 2** illustrates the planning phases and integration. Source adapted from Condè (1979: 29).

**Table 2:** *Planning Phases and Integration of Programmes and Projects*

Phase A	Situation analysis	This phase is important in the integration process and leads to multisectoral analysis of current issues. Knowledge of current issues are important to make an efficient analysis. The selection of priorities in relation to the current issues at stakes, the options available and general objectives pursued. Formulation of possible solution – an institutional framework are developed, and allow for grassroots participation.
Phase B	Setting up decision – making and implementation structures	Adapting an administrative institution. Create joint – teams at all decision – making and implementation levels. A machinery process that can supervise and coordinate staff. Create participation.
Phase C	Formulation of programmes and operational plans	Quantification of objectives and the choice of strategies (i.e. resources, costs, team – work, general objectives, etc). Translations of strategies into programmes and projects.
Phase D	Implementation, coordination and evaluation	Administrative and technical coordination of operations. Management and integrated supply of services and resources. Monitor and evaluate the implementation of programmes and projects.

In Phase A, the identification of issues must be a joint process so that all stakeholders are aware of what the organisation wants to achieve. With regards to the formulation of solutions, strategic orientation must be mapped out with regards to the problems posed. It is at this level that a clear – cut option for an integrated approach is determined. In Phase B, without a clear



defined policy, it is not possible to devise teamwork and efficient working relationships.

Phase A and B should lead into Phase C which leads to specific objectives for the plans and operational decisions. The quantification of objectives is important, it helps to determine whether objectives are compatible with others and whether the means are appropriate to the ends to be achieved. This is part of learning process.

In Phase D it is important to monitor and evaluate implementation and to adapt to shortcomings and difficulties. The main purpose of evaluation must be to guide policy choices and implementation, and also to improve programmes and objectives. This is part of a learning process.

### **2.3.2. Integration and participation in decision – making**

Participation demands a certain sense of organisation in decision – making, and envisage involving people. “Participation is an essential part of human growth, that is the development of self – confidence, pride, initiative, creativity, responsibility, cooperation.” (Burkey, 1993: 56). Through this process people will learn to take control and ownership of their development.

Applying Burkey’s (1993: 57) argument, participation is achieved when people affected by crime and violence become involved and aware of their own situation, of the socio – economic problems, the causes of these problems, and what they themselves can do to change their own situation. Through the involvement and awareness of people, they will be able to understand the causes of crime and violence and would be in a position to utilise the available resources to improve their own situation. This is empowerment through participation.

Burkey (1993: 68) argues that through participation, individuals have to learn to be patient with people whom themselves needs to become aware of how they can change and improve their own development. What is important here is to systematically work to strengthen the capacity of people. This relates to



the social learning process, which Kotze (1997: 43) describes as the bottom - up mode of decision - making and partnership. People are included in the learning process of development. The objectives of a development programme and or project are tuned to address the need and or requirements of the people.

Jagannadham in Kotze (1997: 37-38) draws a distinction between participation and involvement. Participation implies “to share in”, whereas involvement implies that people becomes involved in the development process. People can identify with development efforts and feel that they belong to various programmes and projects. De Beer and Swanepoel (1998: 24-25) argues that participation creates empowerment whereby the human needs of people are being addressed through a social learning process (to accept, identify and resolve problems), through collective action (where people act together) through self – empowerment and to release people from the poverty trap.

One of the principles of the Constitution of South Africa (1996) to which public administration (including the SAPS) should adhere is to ensure that services are delivered to people’s need and requirements. The White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery (1997) and the White Paper on Safety and Security (1998) compelled SAPS to enhanced partnership policing with communities.

Kotze (1997: 40) argues that bottom - up decision - making is concerned with promoting participation. Therefore, the role of developers/ development agents should change from telling people what to do, to acting as a facilitator by cooperating with people, analysing problems and working out solutions. Kotze (1997: 41) argues for partnership action in decision - making, where decisions are taken by a partnership consisting of central and local decision - makers. Partnership action in decision - making is necessary in order to secure support from a central level and at a local level to gain the perspective and knowledge of people. In the SAPS, both a bottom - up and top - down approach to decision - making is vital. The existence of a partnership action between the two decision - making approaches is important. A Community Police Forum (CPF) can make decisions (at a local level) about the implementation of social



crime prevention programmes and projects, but needs inputs of central decision - makers regarding the allocation of funds, equipment, etc.

### **2.3.3. System thinking management**

System thinking management as an integrated approach helps the organisation and its environment to constantly learn, change and interact. It enables an organisation to manage and adapt to dynamic situations both internal and external. The emphasis of the system thinking approach is on the availability of information towards better decision – making.

The system approach regards an organisation as an open system. The organisation exists in an environment which has boundaries and is dynamic. The open - system consists of various interacting or inter departmental parts. The interacting parts are the human being as individuals in groups, and in the formal and informal organisation (Simon in Duffy, 1971: 59).

System thinking, as related to the theory of “integration”, looks at a holistic rather than partial view of what is necessary for good management. Doing things in a one sided way will not be possible to learn from an intervention that can modify assumptions and improve chances of success on later practices (Jackson, 1992: 37). It is important to do things in many ways, so that one can be able to see things differently, and assess/ evaluate from how seeing things differently can improve your own chances of success.

According to (Jackson, 1992: 45) the system thinking approach argues that organisations should be seen as a whole systems made – up of interrelated parts. The trouble with other theories according to the system perspectives is that they concentrate on one or two aspects of the organisation, i.e. the traditional approach concentrate on task and structure. The human relation theory is more concerned with issues such as group behaviour, individual motivation and leadership, whereas the system approach looks at the organisation as whole. It sees the organisation as an “open – system” in constant interaction with its environment, as opposed to the narrow perspective of traditional models, which tends to ignore environmental impact.



In terms of the system theory, organisations are made up of parts existing in close inter – relationship and possessing *needs*. Both Spencer and Durkheim in Jackson (1992: 45) saw social systems as made up of mutually dependent elements functioning in ways that contribute to the maintenance of the whole. Therefore, the various parts of an organisation could be understood in terms of the contribution it makes to the maintenance of the whole organisation. Thus arguing that organisations are “adaptive structures” which adapt their goals and change themselves in response to environmental impact.

SAPS is an organisation with components which function in ways that contribute to the maintenance of the whole organisation. All these components contribute to the maintenance of the organisation. For SAPS to maintain its structure, it needs to adapt its goals to changes in the environment. The SAPS strategy and structure needs to conform to the requirements of its clients. (See Senge, 1994).

In **Table 3**, Jackson (1992: 46) provides four function imperatives that must be fulfilled in a system by its subsystems if that system is to continue to exist. The four imperatives are adaptation, goal attainment, integration and latency (pattern maintenance), which constitute the AGIL model.

**Table 3:**      *The AGIL Model for continued existence*

A	Adaptation	The system has to establish relationships between itself and its external environment.
G	Goal Attainment	Goals have to be defined and resources mobilised and managed in pursuit of these goals.
I	Integration	The system has to have a means of coordinating its efforts.
L	Latency (pattern maintenance)	The first three requisites (adaptation, goal attainment and integration) for organisational survival have to be solved with the minimum of strain and tension by ensuring that organisational “actors” are motivated to act in the appropriate manner.

The AGIL model integrates the imperatives with various levels in the organisation (technical -, managerial – and institutional level). The organisation has to accommodate AGIL to survive. The management task within an organisation will differ; depending upon which of the three levels



(technical, managerial and institutional) it operates. At a technical level, it is more concerned with a transformation process. At a managerial level it integrates the technical level activities and mediate between these and the institutional level. At an institutional level it integrates the organisation with the wider community it serves.

### 2.3.4. Project Management

Van der Walldt and Knipe (1998: 59) define project management as, “.... a set of principles, methods, tools, and techniques for the effective management of objective – orientated work in the context of a specific and unique organisational environment.” It is a planning and control mechanism for using resources to achieve specific objectives. To achieve the objectives of an organisation requires a number of diverse tasks. The performing of these tasks bring together different expertise and experience. Archibald (1992: 92) refers to different expertise and experience as the *project stakeholder*, who has vested interest, responsibility and decision power in the project and its results.

A crucial step in the formulation of a project is to identify those factors vital to the development of the project and its successful implementation (Goodman and Have, 1980: 6). It will crystallise focus and determine roles relative to other projects. Through this, duplication and possible conflict can be taken into account at the early stages of the project cycle. It helps to increase the probability of success. (See Burke 1999).

Within the “integrated” concept, plans and implementation strategies should not be done in isolation from other current projects. An inter – relationship should exist, taking into account the interactions amongst various plans/ projects and their influences on one another. (See Kiggundu, 1989; Conyers and Hills, 1990).

In the SAPS various projects are planned and implemented to support the objectives of the police in the prevention of crime and violence. The various projects, which manifests itself in the form of operational task teams, are still done in isolation from each other. Although all projects are aimed at

addressing the objectives of the SAPS, there is still no interaction amongst the various programmes and projects and almost no influences on one another. What is also lacking in the SAPS is the constant reviewing of a project as it develops, which makes it difficult to be in control of the process.

Another process that is important in the formulation of projects is to consider the support systems, whether it is adequate to support objectives or goals. Often plans are formulated which requirements exceed resources.

In Briner et al (1996: 125), the emphasis is on constant modification of the projects specification as it develops. The project also becomes a participatory, capacity building and empowering learning process. Briner refers to any changes in the project, identifying any problems, re - plan where necessary, re - allocate resources and support if required. However, these activities can only be carried out if the project manager and stakeholders are aware of the project progress. A continuous planning review system cycle is necessary to maintain control and to enable the project to move forward. Such a review system cycle is important in maintaining the commitment and confidence of stakeholders, achieving objectives and being in control of the process.

### **2.3.5. Problem – orientated policing**

Problem – orientated policing is based on the idea that the police needs to focus attention on the ends of policing, away from the traditional emphasis of policing. It is based on the assumption that careful analysis of problems will enable the police to create policies and procedures that provide useful guidance for officers in their efforts to address the complexity of community problems.

The differences between problem – orientated policing and traditional policing, is that problem – orientated policing direct officers away from viewing individual occurrences as unrelated incidents towards a focus on the underlying factors that account for the repetitious nature of some incidents, i.e. a more integrated and holistic, analytical and strategic orientation.



Problem – orientated policing demands that the police go beyond taking satisfaction in the smooth operation of their organisation. It requires that they extend their concern to dealing effectively with the problems that justify creating a police agency in the first instance (Goldstein, 1990: 15). Burkey (1993: 53-55) refers to this as “thinking the unthinkable”. Within development we need to continuously ask ourselves the *why* question, in order to demonstrate *what* is possible. It also means the stimulation of self – reflected critical awareness of the social reality and the ability to transform that reality into collective action. The need for action reflection action is of importance at this point. (See Marais, Tailor and Kaplan, 1997).

Problem – orientated policing identifies and analyse problems and implement solutions to resolve the underlying causes of the problem. Community members, business, and governmental agencies may be central participants in the analysis and resolution process. It also emphasises proactive policing/ intervention rather than reactive responses to calls for service resolution of root causes rather than symptoms. It makes use of multiparty, community - based problem solving rather than unilateral police response. Problem – orientated policing focuses on a problem in the long – term and in a comprehensive manner, rather than addressing the problem as a series of separate incidents to be resolved via arrest or other police actions.

### **2.3.6. Programme management**

The researcher will apply the Brinkerhoff model of program management as an integrated approach.

Brinkerhoff (1991: 8) defined programmes as long term, multi - activity endeavours implemented by networks of institutions in multiple locations whose production and/ or service delivery objectives and impact goals derive from indigenous policy choices. Programmes are thus long – term related activities that are linked to the strategic issues/ objectives of the organisation and can facilitate change in the environment. Programme management involves a set of related activities to achieve objectives normally assigned to



an organisation, whereas projects concentrate on individual activities to achieve a specific target.

The concentration on individual activities (projects) could have duplicative affects, multiplications of tasks that can lead to the inability of providing goods at the end of projects. Within a programme management environment, the organisation's administrative capacity and operating resources needs to be link to the programme. Therefore, it is important to manage a programme and at the same time look at administrative capacity, resources and personnel satisfaction. Thus, for the success of programme implementation, programme managers have to sustain the programme.

This shift in strategic orientation will also call for a new research methodology, which is multidisciplinary and holistic in nature. New policing - partnerships will be created not only between the police, the community, the business sector, government/ local government and the NGO sector, but also with the scientific research community, i.e. universities/ technickons and bodies like the Human Research Science Council, international partnerships and research linkages between the SAPS and other countries.

What are central to sustaining a programme are its participants. In Brinkerhoff (1991: 147) the ends of a programme are achieved through the concerted efforts of people. Thus, all development objectives relate to people as ends and means. Programme goals are achieved through the collective action of people involved through various ways. Therefore, the managing of human resources (i.e. salaries, personal needs, incentives, etc) effectively, is important. People involved in programmes should be treated as ends too, not simply as tools and/ or instruments. Programme managers need to look at incentives to keep staff motivated and positive. For sustainability, needs and capability of the programme needs to be adjusting to needs of people. This is a fundamental shift to people - centred development and self - reliance as Burkey (1993) argues. This also relates to the latest programme/ projects principles as accommodated by IDP – strategies for local government participation (White Paper on Local Government, 1998).



Programmes are integrated into several organisational settings, linked to policy implementation and operate in many different areas. These features make it crucial for programmes not only to be directed to the inner workings of the organisation, but to be outward focused on the environments those programmes must confront. It is important to identify and assess critical factors in both the internal and external environments and develop and implement strategies for coping with the environmental factors that will have an impact on programme performance and sustainability.

Programme managers need to look at the environment in terms of its complexity, uncertainty, threats, support, or some combination of these characteristics. These characteristics might shift in ways that can help the programme or it can have a detrimental impact on it. In order to maintain a fit between the programme's environment and achieve sustained performance, programme managers should combine and/ or interlink design, structure, processes and participants. Programme manager's needs to anticipate changes and seek to guide or influence external forces in their favour. Programme managers also have to keep in mind, that the more uncertain or hostile the environment, the more they have to monitor, analyse and adapt to changing environmental conditions. This also implies that strategies and structures must be more flexible to enable response and adaptation to shifts in the environment and to be able to predict reliable future environmental conditions. It is obvious that these interventions require a learning process programme/ project style and approach and not a blueprint. (See Burke, 1999 and Senge, 1994).

The structure of a programme is important, because it influences information flow and the nature of human interaction. It shapes who does what and how, who knows what, and who reports to whom. It creates a pattern of interaction among participants of various activities within a programme setting. There are two basic elements of structure in a programme, which is the dividing up of tasks and how to coordinate activities. These two elements of structure can be managed in a narrow span hierarchy or either in a wide span hierarchy. The narrow span hierarchy is more complicated and calls for higher control and closer supervision. Whereas the wide span hierarchy is more or less



opportunistic for supervision, communication and less complicated. A programme is a wide span structure where specialisation is a factor. It gives the organisation the capacity to address increased levels of innovation and facilitate processes of learning and adaptation, i.e. action reflection action.

Brinkerhoff (1991: 125) concentrates upon three important systems for programme managers. The *guidance system* provides information for the program. It is a framework to allocate tasks and responsibilities, assess problems and progress, scan the environment and determine changes required. The *reporting system* focuses on handling information flows for the purpose of monitoring and implementing progress and supporting decisions concerning operational activities. The *financial system* informs the programme manager and decision – makers how funds are being committed, whether they are allocated to highest priority activities and/ or used efficiently, and what future resources are likely to be needed.

Managers need to look at their programme performance improvement and build implementation capacity. They need to determine how their programmes perform in order to make **fits** for **gaps** (the need for change). Once managers are able to make **fits** for **gaps**, they start to realise that throughout the process the actual programme change. Managing performance improvements help programme managers to realise the differences between the current/ actual situation and desired future state.

Performance improvement needs to be based on an understanding of the situation where intervention is being contemplated. Managers should be able to look at sources of problems in relation to each other. (See **Figure 2**, an illustration of interrelatedness of performance problems). Each problem is linked to each other in a relative complex ways. Analysing performance means more than covering problems and things that are wrong. Performance analysis concentrate on what is right and/ or work, and at the same time look at what is wrong.


Keeping performance going also involves building and maintaining capacity. A critical element to programme capacity is the ongoing access to

maintenance of human resources. Effectiveness to this capacity can be given through recruiting of qualified staff, effective incentives for job performances, opportunities for skill development, critical views, promotions and salary improvements.

Another element of keeping performance improvement going, is *sustainability*. Brinkerhoff (1991: 194) defines sustainability as, “a program’s ability to produce outputs and benefits that are valued highly enough by groups that command resources ... to ensure an ongoing supply of inputs to enable the programme to continue production.” In managing sustainability, managers need to reflect upon their choices and actions in relation to what impact it will have on the program’s output flows and benefits, i.e. again, a process of action reflection action.

The SAPS consists of structures (components) that are not necessarily guided by its organisational strategy, i.e. when Operation Good - Hope was launched; there was no strategy that guided its formation of structures. A strategy was developed, after structures were already in place. The SAPS put in place planning and implementation strategies, but failed to develop a performance mechanism to evaluate its successes and failures.

**Figure 2:** *Interrelatedness of performance problems: action reflection action*





The Brinkerhoff model, suggest that programme management consist of three tasks: looking out, looking in and looking ahead. "Program managers look out for mission and objectives, clients to serve, inputs to obtain, key stakeholders to please, a policy context to articulate, appreciate or to influences. They look in at programme design, structure, systems and processes, and people. They look ahead to outputs and impacts and then to efficiency, effectiveness, capacity building and sustainability." (Brinkerhoff ,1991: 23).

## **2.4. THE INFLUENCES OF THE ENVIRONMENT ON THE INTEGRATED APPROACH**

According to Katz and Kahn in (Jackson, 1992: 49), "Organisations are best represented as entities in close interrelationship with their environments, taking in inputs and transforming them into outputs. These outputs in the form of products can provide the means for new inputs, so that the cycle can begin again." The main purpose is to maintain a steady and stable organisation. Organisational interrelationship is important to seek control over the environment, in order to reduce uncertainty or, where that is not possible, to adapt its own structures to accord with environmental demands. If an organisation's structure is not adept to the environment, opportunities are lost, and the existence/ or maintenance of the organisation is threatened.

"Any practical planning approach must be able to cope with certain basic requirements of the environment in which it operates" (Weitz, 1979: 27). Organisational plans are influenced by environmental factors; it is therefore essential that the activities of an organisation should be consciously related to the changes in the environment. Weitz (1979) argues that the planning approach of an organisation should be able to identify the factors affecting the development process. What is crucial in this argument is for stakeholders to be able to understand the effects of changes in the environment and their role in development. This implies that planning has to be flexible and adaptable to accommodate factors influencing the environment.

Goals within organisations must be chosen that ensures the legitimacy and the viability of the organisation within the context of its wider environment. In an uncertain and turbulent environment, goals will have to be more flexible and multiple, satisfying a variety of constraints. The uncertain and turbulent environments require an adaptive management system, and demands more flexibility and commitment from members. Burns and Stalker in (Jackson, 1992: 57), refers to the *organismic* structure, that show less formal task definition, greater task interdependence, continual ratification of duties, horizontal as well as vertical communication, and greater decentralisation of decision – making. The *mechanistic* structure as opposed to the organismic structure, is suitable for stable environments. Mechanistic structures exhibit specialisation, independence of tasks, strict rules, vertical communication, tight job descriptions, and a hierarchy with communication coming down from an omniscient leader at the top. The above distinction relates to the differences between a learning and a blueprint as well as a bottom - up and top - down process. (See Smith, 1993).

According to Schutte (1981: 4), “The effectiveness of an organisation’s action is reflected in an organisation’s ability to anticipate changes in the environment and to develop strategies in advance of such changes.” As part of developing strategies in advance, one should start with an evaluation of past and/ or current performances. Through this process an attempt is made to establish trends and to predict what will happen in the future. Development of new strategies should be considered whether it might affect the life span of current strategies/ plans.

The *analysing of trends* is essential for any organisation. It is important to study the organisation’s long – term trends in each of its major areas, to diagnose their meanings and from this interpretation to revise policies and practices, as and if necessary. Using trend analysis, it is possible to determine whether trends are positive or negative.



## 2.5. EXAMPLES OF AN INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT APPROACH

The following two boxes provide examples to illustrate the principles of the integrated approach:

### **EXAMPLE 1: *PARTNERSHIP APPROACHES IN BRITAIN***

In Britain it is been accepted that the police service cannot be held solely responsible for community safety or for tackling crime or fear of crime in their area in isolation. The growing complexity of society requires a multifaceted response. Hence the introduction of a partnership approach with local agencies. With the partnership approach to community safety, the police work with local services, which include environmental health, leisure, social services, housing and planning departments at local levels, to prevent crime. In tackling crime, the partnership approach is supported by an integration of legislations (like Race Relation Act 1976, Local Government Act 1972, London Local Authorities Act 1990, Children Act and Education Reform Act 1988) to give local authorities the power to commit expenditure for crime prevention purposes in a variety of ways. In this partnership model there is a community safety committee operating in a multi - agency basis. Members include relevant local service providers such as youth, recreation and leisure, probation, social services, housing, the police, business, various voluntary organisations such as victim support organisations. The police play an important part in such committees in providing information and the capacity for analysis. The role of such a group would be to develop plans and to define and negotiate projects and activities. This would include the overseeing of crime prevention panels, business and crime groups, and a coalition against crime. A partnership/ multi-agency approach can help to avoid duplication of effort and prevent different agencies pulling in opposite directions. It may also, by focussing resources in a planned way, have a much more significant impact on solving problems than would otherwise be the case. Usually the local partnership identifies priority areas for attention and allocates responsibility for leading the area to a partner. For example, in one local partnership, five priority areas were identified:

- Burglary – led by the police.
- Violence against women – led by the probation service.
- Racial attacks – led by the race – equality council.
- Youth crime prevention – led by social services.
- Tidy Britain campaign, people and places – led by contract and construction services.

The aforementioned initiatives demonstrate what can be achieved when different players work together. However, problems can arise in developing the partnership approach unless the differential power relations are recognised at the outset. Statutory agencies, for instance, enjoy greater power in real terms than community groups. The latter therefor need to be able to articulate their concerns effectively so that the agenda does not solely reflect state agency concerns. Ways of working will be dissimilar, and compromises will need to be found. Methods of accountability need to be found which ensure that local people are involved in designing action as well as feed back results of action taken on their behalf.

Adapted from Stevens and Yach (1995)



## **EXAMPLE 2: THE CUCAS APARTMENT COMPLEX**

Drugs were a particular problem in the Cucas, with inadequate lighting and poorly marked streets facilitating the drug trade while hindering police enforcement efforts. Communication problems within the department also limited enforcement. Narcotics complaints typically bypassed the patrol level to go directly to the Narcotics Division. In addition, the officers who patrolled the area often bypassed needed information. In order to improve communication within the department, two officers proposed a coordinated flow of information in which the Narcotics Street Team would share information with patrol. They also requested contacts and information related to the Cucas from other patrol officers, via a line-up book.

Contact was also made with the San Diego Housing Commission, which provided information and assistance and informed them that they planned to install additional lighting and new street signs. California Properties and AMP Property Management, the companies responsible for maintenance and property management of the Cucas, worked with the officers on the location of the street lighting, provided the detailed street maps, and approved the removal of abandoned cars after police officers enforced vehicle code violations. The officers worked with apartment management to enforce Section 8 housing regulation that, in part, expedite the eviction process of tenants implicated in drug activity.

Police enforcement efforts also were focused on the Cucas. Plainclothes officers were assigned to the area to identify the sources of drugs, conduct undercover investigations, and increase arrests of dealers. Other officers and the Narcotics Street team also assisted in this project by providing narcotics information directly to the project officers and the others working in the area. Supervisors provided support, advice, and feedback and helped circulate information about the project through the department.

They worked with citizens to get information on illegal activity and obtained maps and statistical information from crime analysis, to relate suspects' addresses to crime locations. As the project evolved, a street robbery task force was created. This task force included members of the newly formed Neighbourhood Policing Team, patrol officers and sergeants, a robbery detective, two bike officers, and a storefront community service officer. The members had biweekly meetings and also met with area property owners, business managers, and representatives from various city agencies including housing, zoning, an eviction attorney, litter and waste, and graffiti control. Citizens were normally asked to identify specific problems and participate in problem solving by submitting Citizen Referral forms to the police officers.

Adapted from Goldstein (1990)



## 2.6. SUMMARY

This chapter focused on different theoretical approaches to integrated development. Legislative policy frameworks, i.e. the Constitution of 1996, RDP White Paper of 1994, The White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery of 1997, Safety and Security White Paper of 1998, Local Government White Paper of 1998, Integrated Development Plan of 1993 and the National Crime Prevention Strategy of 1996, guide the Integrated Development Approach. These legislative policies can be managed by the approaches to integrated development analysed in the above sections. The different integrated development approaches, focus on multi – holistic approaches to managing an organisation (see **Figure 3**).


The aforementioned identified integrated approaches to development are supported by the building blocks of development, i.e. participation, social learning, capacity building, empowerment, self – reliance and sustainability. What is of importance in terms of sustaining an integrated development approach is the continuous adoption of the organisational strategy and structure to the continuous changes in the environment.

Within the context of the study, the integrated development approach is guided by the Constitution of South Africa (1996) and by the following policy frameworks of the South African Government:

- Integrated Development Plan (1993);
- The White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery (1997);
- The White Paper on Reconstruction and Development Programme (1994);
- The White Paper on Safety and Security (1998); and
- The National Crime Prevention Strategy (1996).

The aforementioned policy frameworks can be managed by the approaches of integrated development, i.e. problem orientated policing, integrated development, participative decision making, system – thinking approach, programme management and project management.

**Figure 3:** *Holistic Approach to Integrated Development*





# **CHAPTER THREE**

## **PRESENTATION OF CRIME PREVENTION**

### **APPROACHES TO VIOLENT CRIMES: OPERATION**

#### **GOOD - HOPE AS A CASE STUDY**

### **3.1. INTRODUCTION**

The previous chapter dealt with different perspectives on integrated development approaches.

In this chapter the study will focus on Operation Good - Hope (a SAPS operational strategy) as a case study, to present and analyse crime prevention approaches to violent crimes.

### **3.2. DATA ON THE OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS OF**

#### **OPERATION GOOD - HOPE**

#### **3.2.1. The purpose of Operation Good - Hope**

On 12 January 1999, Operation Good - Hope was established as a new SAPS strategy, to be coordinated at a national level to fight urban terror and related crimes in the Western Cape. In relation to its predecessors, i.e. Operation Saladin, Operation Recoil, Operation Chaka, Operation Madusa and the PAGAD Task Team, extra police, money and equipment has being poured into Operation Good - Hope at a cost of around R 4,3 million a month (Cape Argus, 1999/01/12). See **Appendix 7.2.**, Cape Argus publication of Operation Good - Hope.

Operation Good - Hope was established to focus on the following three dimensions:

- i. The **operational dimension** followed a proactive approach where certain areas were identified by intelligence personnel and then saturation (an overwhelming concentration of military forces) operations followed. This dimension also had a reaction group capacity that reacted to incidents, which have already taken place.
- ii. The **investigation dimension** was based on a project - driven investigation. Its tasks were:
  - to secure a close working relationship with the Department of Justice and with the Investigative Directorate of Organised Crime (IDOC);
  - to ensure that all investigations are supported by forensic specialist;
  - to ensure a successful bail opposing mechanism;
  - to conduct intelligence driven investigations; and
  - to ensure an effective witness protection programme.
- iii. The **intelligence dimension** consisting of personnel from all of South Africa's intelligence agencies. This dimension focussed on:
  - involving the larger community in forwarding information regarding urban terrorism and organised crime;
  - launch intelligence driven operations; and
  - to gather and verify information and ensure tasking thereof.

The operational plan of Operation Good - Hope was divided into the following three (3) phases:

#### **Phase 1:      Short term**

This phase consisted of the following steps:

- concentrate on urban terror;
- supplement command structure;
- additional personnel and equipment;



- additional budget;
- province continue with all other functions;
- joint inter - departmental approach; and
- joint operational and community approach.

## **Phase 2: Medium term**

This phase consisted of the following steps:

- community role;
- intelligence operations;
- successful investigations; and
- deployment of stability, reaction and high - risk groups.

## **Phase 3: Long term**

The phase consisted of the following steps:

- community protection;
- zero tolerance;
- create a climate for normalisation;
- specialised units; and
- new unit for the Western Cape.

With the aforementioned operational plan, management reserved the right to make changes to the plan, if necessary.

The first phase of the operational plan was launched with:

- high density patrols;
- deployment of an operational leg;
- visible operations;
- external communication;
- the identification of so called high risk areas;
- the identification of high profile figures involved in urban terror;

- the involvement of the community at large in combating these crimes; and
- the expansion of Operation Good - Hope's focus to other parts of the Western Cape, i.e. Southern Cape and Boland.

### **3.2.2. The Structure of Operation Good - Hope**

Operation Good - Hope was launched as a South African Police Service initiative, with almost all expertise and skills from within. Operation Good - Hope was coordinated at a national level (in the office of former SAPS National Commissioner, George Fivaz), although the focus and functioning was in the Western Cape Province.

The commander of Operation Good - Hope was Assistant Commissioner Daniels (Area Commissioner of the Boland Area in the Western Cape) later succeeded by Director Mpembe (Deputy Provincial Commissioner, Gauteng). The commander of Operation Good - Hope, directly reported to the SAPS National Commissioner in Pretoria.

Many staff for Operation Good - Hope was being flowed in from other provinces. They include a special task force that was responsible for major operations, highly skilled detectives from the SAPS Murder and Robbery branches and senior officers from the South African National Defence Force (SANDF).

The structure of Operation Good - Hope consisted of the following components/ functions and involvement:

- National Operational Co - ordinating Committee (NOCOC)
- Provincial Operational Co - ordinating Committee (POCOC)
- National Intelligence Co - ordinating Committee (NICOC)
- Provincial Intelligence Co - ordinating Committee (PICOC)
- Operational components that included the participation of SAPS Public Order Police Services (POPS) and SANDF



- SAPS Air wing
- Investigation component that included investigators from the SAPS Murder and Robbery Unit and other specialised investigation units and a
- Component that included the SAPS intelligence.

See **Appendix 7.3.**, structure of Operation Good - Hope.

### **3.2.3. Operation Good - Hope and crime statistics**

**Appendix 7.4.** (Comparative statistics: Selected crimes per area: Western Cape), depicts comparative analysis of crime rates before Operation Good - Hope period and during Operation Good - Hope period in the respective geographical policing areas in the Western Cape.

**Appendix 7.4.** indicates that there was more selected crime incidents/ occurrence during the Operation Good - Hope period and a lessor number of selected incidents/ occurrence before Operation Good - Hope period.

**Table 4** depicts the overall sum of selected crimes per policing area in the Western Cape:

<b>AREA</b>	<b>TYPE OF CRIME</b>	<b>BEFORE OPERATION GOOD - HOPE PERIOD (1996 – 1997)</b>	<b>OPERATION GOOD - HOPE PERIOD (1998 – 1999)</b>
Boland	Selected crime: Illegal possession of firearms/ammunition/ drug related	53808 5358	100333 8302
Eastern Metropole	Selected crime: Illegal possession of firearms/ammunition/ drug related	71662 3629	128924 5969
Southern Cape	Selected crime: Illegal possession of firearms/ammunition/ drug related	23118 2098	42951 2956
West Metropole	Selected crime: Illegal possession of firearms/ammunition/ drug related	107478 5336	191322 9245
<b>Total</b>		<b>256066</b>	<b>463530</b>

Adapted from **Appendix 7.4.**, Comparative statistics: Selected crimes: Per area in the Western Cape

Selected crimes during the Operation Good - Hope period had increased with 55,24% (207464).

Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition and drug related crimes during the Operation Good - Hope period had increased with 62% (10051).

The aforementioned selected crimes are reported and policed at police station level, area level and by specialised units in the SAPS, i.e. the Provincial



Detective Unit, Serious Violent Crime Unit, etc. Operation Good - Hope did not police these types of crimes. The interpretation therefore is that the SAPS put maximised/ or almost all of its attention, resource allocation into Operation Good - Hope to reduce the high level of urban terror and other serious crimes. On the other side the identified selected crimes (policed as a normal policing function) (See **Appendix 7.4.**) increased with more than 55%. SAPS didn't take into consideration that beside crimes policed by Operation Good - Hope, day-to-day crimes also need to be policed as a normal policing function. There was no balance kept in terms of managing the function of Operation Good - Hope, and at the same time managing the function of normal policing (stabilising and normalising the identified selected crimes).

**Appendix 7.5.**, statistics on urban terror and gang related violence, depicts the following:

- Over 441 gang related shootings during 1998, reduced to 316 incidents in 1999, a decrease of 28%.
- In 1998, 72 pipe bomb attacks and 86 shooting incidents.
- In 1998, shooting incidents decreased by 45,6% to 46 attacks, and pipe bomb attacks decreased to almost 87,5% (9) in 1999.

Source adapted from (Kinnes, 2000: 37–40).

The statistical information from **Appendix 7.5.** indicates a sharp decrease in the trends of urban terror and gang related violence. However, Kinnes (2000: 40) is of the opinion that the visible drop in the incidence of attacks is not sufficient evidence that the operation of gangs and vigilantes have been stopped. According to Kinnes (2000: 40), the figures show that gangs have been fighting among themselves while, at the same time, having to deal with threat and attacks from vigilantes.

By early 1997, 667 attacks were executed related to the urban terror and gangsterism – including pipe bombings, petrol bombings and drive by shootings. A total of 168 arrests of PAGAD members and 140 alleged

gangsters have been made, but no one has been convicted of any crime. (See **Appendix 7.6.**, Cape Times article on urban terror and gang related crimes).

### 3.2.4. The financial expenditure of Operation Good - Hope

Research into financial expenditure of Operation Good - Hope reflected that an amount of R 7,5 million was allocated for the duration of 1999-01-26 to 1999-03-25, instead of the quoted figure of R 4,3 million per month (Refer to **Appendix 7.2.**). However (for the mentioned three month period), from the amount of R 7,5 million allocated to Operation Good - Hope, just more than R 2,5 million has been spent.

Table 5, adapted from Kagee (1999), provides a summary of expenditure (1999-01-26 to 1999-03-04) for Operation Good - Hope.

**Table 5:** Summary expenditure of Operation Good - Hope (1999-01-26 to 1999-03-04)

	<b>ALLOCATED</b>	<b>EXPENDITURE</b>
Personnel expenditure	R 2,506,225,20	R 1,319,696,00
Administration expenditure	R 1,083,200,50	R 377,276,11
Stores and Live stock	R 1,518,121,05	R 775,583,85
Equipment	R 527,128,29	R 6,476,16
Professional and Special services	R 1,893,536,21	R 137,395,38
<b>Total</b>	<b>R 7,528,211,25</b>	<b>R 2,616,427,30</b>

According to the former head of Operation Good - Hope, Assistant Commissioner Daniels (Mail & Guardian, 1999), there have been some difficulties spending the money because of the extent of the operation.



A close look at the budget shows that it pays for repairs of vehicles from other provinces at the expense of Operation Good - Hope (Mail & Guardian, 1999). The budget shows that most of the money was allocated to personnel costs, including overtime and night shift allowances.

Much of the budget allocation also went towards providing bodyguards for several of the detectives seconded to the operation, following the killing of Captain Bennie Lategan, a key investigator for Operation Good - Hope. Just more than a third of the R 1,083 million allocated to administration costs has been spent on reinforcements – both police and SANDF troops from outside the Western Cape. No budget has been set aside for communication. However, R 34 208 has been spent on it. The allocated budget for air services (helicopter wing) of R 47 588 was exceeded with an amount of R 205 474 expended.

The aforementioned data indicates that there has been poor and inefficient budgetary planning for Operation Good - Hope, although operations have continued. The lack of proper budget planning confirms that Operations Good - Hope was not guided by a cohesive strategy. This is also confirmed by the media lately.

Within a project plan, need identification, the development of a scope baseline (i.e. determine the end products, determine the need for resources – and kind of activities) and the establishment of a budget is important for the successful implementation of a project (Burke, 1999: 28). From table 5 it is clear that Operation Good – Hope had no need identification and the scope of its project was not determined. Therefore, it was unable to allocate a proper budget plan for its project strategy. The differences between the amount of money allocated and spend, indicates that there was a lack of financial planning within Operation Good – Hope. It further indicates that the financial allocation and expenditure was not guided by a cohesive strategy.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **DATA ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH FINDINGS**

#### **4.1. INTRODUCTION**

In this chapter, the researcher will link the previous three chapters with the research findings. The data analysis from the structured interviews will be presented in this chapter. The results of the data analysis will be compared with the theories on integrated approaches (refer to chapter 2) and will be related to the hypothesis as stated in chapter 1. The main results from the data analysis will be presented in this chapter. Thereafter, a decision to reject or retain the hypothesis will be taken in the light of the respective results (Bless and Higson - Smith, 1995: 150).

In order to reject or retain the hypothesis, a structured thumb - press interview was compiled for the study, undertaken to personally interview eleven stakeholders.

#### **4.2. ANALYSIS OF PARTICIPANT'S RESPONSES IN RELATION TO OPERATION GOOD - HOPE AND THE INTEGRATED APPROACH**

##### **4.2.1. Perceptions of Operation Good - Hope**

The responses of all interviewees indicated that they have an understanding regarding the purpose of Operation Good - Hope. All interviewees responded that the purpose of Operation Good - Hope was to deal with urban terror (as a violent crime), specific related to PAGAD and gang related crimes. The researcher found that the interviewees understood that the purpose of Operation Good - Hope was to be implemented in the following three (3) phases:



- Phase 1: joint approach
- Phase 2: intelligence driven
- Phase 3: stability to normalisation (see chapter 3).

Interviewees stated the following in relation to the purpose of Operation Good

- Hope:

- it was a reaction response to an existing problem (urban terror).  
Operation Good – Hope was launched to enable the SAPS to deal with urban terror;
- it normally focussed on PAGAD and gang related crimes, opposed to have a holistic approach to the problem of serious violent crimes;
- it reacted to a crisis to save South Africa's image internationally;  
and
- it created a base to investigate those implicated in urban terror.

Interviewees were in support of documentary information collected (see chapter 3) that the structure of Operation Good - Hope was under the command of the SAPS National Office. This implies that the stakeholders located in the area where the crime problem occurred (The Western Cape Province), were not in control of Operation Good - Hope. Information gathered from the interviewees, indicates that Operation Good - Hope comprised of SAPS National Crime Prevention, SAPS Public Order Policing Services (POPS), SAPS Serious Violent Crime Unit, SAPS Crime Intelligence and Special Task Teams to protect investigators and high profile commanders of Operation Good - Hope and to do the necessary penetration of suspects.

Interviewees also indicated that the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) was not officially part of the structure of Operation Good - Hope, but was drawn in and allocated operational responsibilities.

Aforementioned data indicates that the SAPS was predominantly the key stakeholder and responsible for Operation Good - Hope.

Interviewees were also uncertain regarding who commanded Operation Good - Hope. Although Assistant Commissioner Daniels and later succeeded by Director Mpembe (now Deputy Provincial Commissioner, Gauteng) was the commanders of Operation Good - Hope, they did not have any decision - making powers, because all decisions regarding Operation Good - Hope were taken at SAPS National level.

Further data collected also indicates that the specialised units, i.e. POPS, PAGAD Task Team, etc under Operation Good - Hope reported both to the SAPS National and Assistant Commissioner Daniels and Director Mpembe. Although Assistant Commissioner Daniels and Director Mpembe were the commanders of Operation Good - Hope, the SAPS National had their own structure and made their own decisions regarding how Operation Good - Hope should operate.

Interviewees confirmed that commanders were appointed without any powers. Some of the interviewees are of the opinion that Operation Good - Hope had a white person as a strategist and a black person as a public figure, based on the culture that only whites could understand the complexity of operations (within the context of the SAPS). This opinion of the interviewees are based on the fact that two black officers (Assistant Commissioner Daniels and Director Mpembe) were appointed as commanders of Operation Good - Hope, without any decision - making powers.

Data collected from interviewees also indicates that the structure of Operation Good - Hope was not guided by a strategy. The operational plan of Operation Good - Hope (refer to chapter 3) was drafted after it was one month in operation.

18% of the interviewees are of the opinion that there was joint working relations between various SAPS components within Operation Good - Hope. 82% of the interviewees are of the opinion that the structure of Operation Good - Hope did not allow for collaboration between stakeholders and showed no sense of partnership.



The following are the main barriers identified by interviewees in Operation Good - Hope:

- Operation Good - Hope was controlled by the SAPS National and was not in touch with local stakeholders both internally and externally;
- The commander of Operation Good - Hope was more a spokesperson than an operational leader;
- Lack of trust amongst stakeholders occurred because incidents were evaluated in a fragmented manner, i.e. if an urban terror incident occurred, various units in Operation Good - Hope were separately and differently tasked to attend to it. There was no collaborative approach and line of communication under the command of Operation Good - Hope;
- Operation Good - Hope was nothing new from its predecessors, i.e. Operation Recoil, Operation Saladin, PAGAD Task Team, etc, only a change in name;
- Operation Good - Hope was launched as a project with no specific beginning and end date in mind;
- Operation Good - Hope was forced to exist, without the recognition, involvement and participation of community organisations;
- Operation Good - Hope negatively affected grassroots policing (resources and personnel were taken away from police stations), as a result normal policing activities suffered;
- Operation Good - Hope concentrated on flash points in the Cape Metro areas, as a result gang and other crime activities moved to rural areas;
- No proper witness protection programme existed;
- The contributing factors to urban terror were never policed; and
- No working relationship between Operation Good - Hope and the National Intelligence Agency existed.

This indicates that Operation Good – Hope, as planning principles confirm, was a planning and implementation failure from the start.

27% of the interviewees are of the opinion that Operation Good - Hope served its purpose because bomb attacks has been reduced. They are of the opinion that Operation Good - Hope might have closed down as a structure, but its principle will continue to exist. This point of view is based on the argument that crime in the Western Cape is dynamic. Every time there is a different type of terror, a different operation is justified.

73% of the interviewees are of the opinion that Operation Good - Hope was a failure due to:

- It never made an impact on urban terror because most of the arrests were made by outside agencies, i.e. IDOC (Investigation Directorate of Organised Crime) and SCORPIONS. Complaints received from communities regarding Operation Good - Hope state that it did not deal with the real issue, the safety of communities;
- Operation Good - Hope became a process, not a project;
- The poor image of Operation Good - Hope is a result of bad leadership behaviour;
- No proper daily crime intelligence and analysis was done;
- Its structure was not guided by its strategy;
- It did not make proper provision for financial management;
- It did not encourage external participation of all stakeholders;
- A lack of communication between Operation Good - Hope and communities;
- It only concentrated on urban terror related to PAGAD;
- Normal policing successes were calculated as the successes of Operation Good - Hope;
- Although Operation Good - Hope succeeded to reduced urban terror, other selected crimes at police station level, i.e. murder, drug related crimes and firearm theft, increased;



- There was an increased in the number of attacks on witnesses and investigators; and
- There was a high level of controversy of police methodology.

Most, if not all of the above issues were confirmed by broad ranging media cover on a daily basis.

The general feeling of the interviewees is that Operation Good - Hope did not address social crime issues. It's focus was to arrest perpetrators of urban terror and to put them behind bars.

All interviewees are in support of the idea that a one - dimensional approach to crime prevention should be scrapped and an integrated development approach be reinforced. However, 27% of the interviewees felt that an integrated development approach should only be applicable to internal SAPS components, whereas 73% felt that an integrated development approach should include stakeholders both internally and externally.

27% of the interviewees felt that Operation Good - Hope was successful to address the continued problem of serious violent crimes. The opinion is based on the fact that the number of arrests increased and urban terror had reduced during the operational period of Operation Good - Hope. 83% of the interviewees felt that Operation Good - Hope did not succeed in addressing the continuous problem of serious violent crimes. There opinion is based on the fact that urban terror is still continuing and no successful convictions were made. This is confirmed by media reports.

Many of the aforementioned perceptions raised by interviewees also share the views of various theories on the integrated development approach (refer to chapter 2).

When Operation Good - Hope was launched, it was tasked to address a specific serious violent crime issue, namely urban terror related to PAGAD and gang crimes. The focus of Operation Good - Hope was narrowed. It did not

holistically look at other causes of crime and violence contributing to the acts of urban terror. Jackson (1994) and Kotze (1997), chapter 2, argue that we should resolve problems within a holistic framework, to view things simultaneously and collectively. What Operation Good - Hope tried to do, is to understand serious violent crime as a separate crime problem, i.e. PAGAD crimes, gang crimes and urban terror. The integrated development approach would look at serious violent crime from a holistic perspective, rather than reducing the problem situation into their parts and trying to understand them as separate entities.

Operation Good - Hope followed a top - down approach to the problem of urban terror and related crimes and was not in touch with grassroots realities. Those in command of Operation Good - Hope had no decision - making powers. The SAPS National imposed Operation Good - Hope. The fact that it was enforced top - down and rigid in nature did not contribute to human growth and development of self - confidence, responsibility and cooperation amongst people affected by serious violent crimes. Therefore Burkey (1993) would argue that the commanders appointed to head the operation and the people affected, did not bond in a learning approach, establishing participation and capacity.

The exclusion of communities during the planning process made it unable for them to understand the causes of urban terror. Burkey (1993) confirms that participation can only be achieved once the people affected by crime and violence become involved and aware of their own situation and do something about it.

Schutte (1981), chapter 2, argued that strategic planning is a process of deciding on the mission and objectives of the organisation and guiding its structures. Data collected indicates that an operational plan (refer to chapter 3) was drafted after structures were put in place. The operational plan itself was not guided by strategic objectives. Therefore, the structures of Operation Good - Hope were not guided by strategic planning.



Operation Good - Hope was initiated without any time period attached to it. It was an initiative launched as a project to address a specific crime problem. According to Burke (1999: 2) every project has a beginning and definite end with a unique scope of work, of given specification, within constraints of cost and time.

Interviewees support the fact that Operation Good - Hope adopted an incident style of policing, by viewing the occurrences of urban terror as unrelated incidents. This could explain the number of bomb blasts (that still continue to take place after the closing down of Operation Good - Hope) and the many arrests of suspects without any successful conviction (refer to chapter 3). Goldstein (1990), chapter 2, support a problem - orientated policing style, which focus on the underlying factors that account for the repetitious nature of some incidents.

#### **4.2.2. Skills and expertise in Operation Good - Hope**

The responses of interviewees support the fact that Operation Good - Hope did have unique skills and expertise in relation to the SAPS in general. It incorporated specific skills and expertise from existing specialised units in the SAPS, i.e. public order policing, forensic, serious violent crime investigators, organised crime investigators, radio and technical assistance and police crime intelligence. Interviewees indicated that these skills and expertise were applied in a fragmented manner, which cause duplicative affects and multiplication of tasks and led to the inability of Operation Good - Hope to adequately address the problem of urban terror and related crimes. Other responses were the lack of strategy and gap analysis which made it difficult for Operation Good - Hope to determine what it needs in terms of skills and expertise and the failure to correctly utilise the skills and expertise to their disposal.

From an integrated perspective (see chapter 2), for an operation like Operation Good - Hope to survive, various skills and experiences needs to be optimised to achieve the fixed goal of the organisation. The idea is to develop a learning -

process in which the various skills and expertise in a problem situation like urban terror, can appreciate each other's contribution to a particular course of action.

A major concern raised by the interviewees was the fact that more skills and expertise were imported from other provinces to help with crime prevention. When these imported skills and expertise left, Operation Good - Hope was no better off. There was no empowerment and no sustainability. As argued in chapter 2, development refers to participation, involvement, empowerment, self - reliance, capacity building, learning, sustainability and people's needs. An imported skill and expertise should have embraced self - reliance, where people learn how to manage their own situation, maintain their self - confidence, make independent decisions and acquire new knowledge and skills effectively to address the problem of violent crimes (see Burkey, 1993: 50-56).

18% of the interviewees indicated that Operation Good - Hope was not a duplicative function of existing specialised activities, i.e. IDOC, POCOC (structures that brings together various policing – military and intelligence agencies to jointly police the problem of serious violent crimes). They felt that Operation Good - Hope was focused on a specific problem, namely urban terror. 82% of the interviewees indicated that Operation Good - Hope was a duplication of the aforementioned existing activities. Further data collected indicates that the presence of Operation Good - Hope created an absence of visible policing – and disempowered police stations to effectively deal with crime prevention. This also confirms the statistical data collected in chapter 3, that during the Operation Good - Hope period selected crimes (including drug related, murder and firearm theft) had increased with 55,24%.

The interviews revealed that the detectives relied mostly on their own investigation abilities due to:

- lack of community support;
- lack of witnesses;
- withdrawing of charges and



- tempering with forensics.

Information gathered from the interviewees also revealed that there was no working relationship between Operation Good - Hope and the National Intelligence Agency (NIA). Detectives in Operation Good - Hope relied on police intelligence for information. This also confirms the data in chapter 3 regarding why Operation Good - Hope was successful in the number of arrests, but unsuccessful with convictions.

The aforementioned data gathered, confirms the theories of Weitz (1979), Jackson (1994), De Beer and Swanepoel (1998), chapter 2, that the active participation of relevant stakeholders in the development process is a crucial factor in the integrated approach. What is important is the active participation of the cross functioning of activities supplementing each other and its dependants on other resources.

#### **4.2.3. Relations/Liaisons in Operation Good - Hope**

The responses gathered from the interviews indicate that Operation Good - Hope did not have any working relationship with crime prevention organisations/ agencies outside the SAPS. The only working relationship that existed was on an ad - hoc basis with the SANDF, IDOC, POCOC. This ad - hoc working relationship was only needed to provide the necessary information and was not part of the process of Operation Good - Hope. An ad - hoc relationship also existed with Business Against Crime (BAC), but interviewees are of the view that this is a forced relationship, due to bomb blasts at business centres. The responses of the interviewees confirm the data in chapter 3 that Operation Good - Hope had no communication strategy. Collaboration in Operation Good - Hope was limited and restricted to the internal SAPS structures. The aforementioned information indicates that partnerships was not prioritised and enhanced as an aspect of crime prevention. It is also clear from the interviewees that a lack of trust existed amongst internal police agents within Operation Good - Hope, i.e. during 1999 in Mitchell's Plain a shooting

incident occurred where both the SAPS Gang Unit and SAPS PAGAD Task Team arrived at the scene, arguing who should handle the case. Related issues was reported in the media.

The general feeling of interviewees indicated that media feedback to communities, reported incidents of PAGAD and gang related violence, without successful results of convictions. This confirms a lack of communication strategy with the media.

The fact that Operation Good - Hope did not have any interrelationship with external organisations could have been a contributing factor to the closing down of it. Enhancing interrelationship with external organisations will secure control over the environment, reduce uncertainty and become easily adaptive to the changes in the environment (Jackson, 1992), chapter 2.

#### **4.2.4. Evaluation of Operation Good - Hope**

82% of the interviewees indicated that the objectives of Operation Good - Hope was not shaped by a proper analysis and clear strategy, i.e. how to include communities, how to get intelligence and investigative driven, how to get suspects prosecuted and to co - operate with other security agencies. It further indicated that the objectives were not guided by a cohesive strategy, and it only focussed on urban terror, which developed out of a crisis. 18% of the interviewees indicated that the operational plan (see chapter 3) provided Operation Good - Hope with a clear strategy. It is argued that Operation Good - Hope did develop an operational plan (see chapter 3) divided into three (3) phases. It is further argued that Operation Good - Hope failed to realise the successful implementation of its operational plan. The responses of 82% of the interviewees confirmed that no integrated development approach was (no cohesive strategy) followed to realise the successful implementation of its operational plan. It further confirmed that Operation Good - Hope developed a one - dimensional approach (SAPS centred) towards its goals, i.e. joint inter - departmental approach, joint operational and community approach, etc.



The overall responses of the interviewees are that Operation Good - Hope's operational plan did not meet the requirements of the communities. However, attempts were made with the SAPS Area police managers to determine what communities wanted. These attempts were not successful. This confirms that the operational plan of Operation Good - Hope was not adaptive to the changes in the environment.

Data gathered from interviewees and confirmed by focus group discussions, indicates that progress review were done on a by - weekly basis, where stakeholders reported on what they have done in terms of policing the urban terror. No threat assessment and or analysis were done.

The following are the responses of the interviewees to the services rendered by Operation Good - Hope and what it has done to enable people to help themselves:

- It was not the objective of Operation Good - Hope to empower people to help themselves;
- The task of Operation Good - Hope was to stabilise urban terror violence;
- Operation Good - Hope was police orientated;
- A call centre was established in Mitchell's Plain, but was not sustainable; and
- It provided communities with a maximum 30 minutes wait to a free number (a free dialling number to report incidents of violent crimes).

It is clear from the aforementioned that Operation Good - Hope did not enable communities to become self - reliant, but disempowered them.

It is the general view of both the interviewees and the focus groups that Operation Good - Hope had enough resources, but that it was not well allocated. A lot of the resources went into visible policing and very little into investigation and intelligence. They also indicated that there was a financial

budget, enough resources and access to military assistance. Operation Good - Hope did not correctly manage the allocation of these resources. This was also confirmed by the media lately.

Data collected from interviewees and the informal focus groups supported the fact that Operation Good - Hope did attempt to contribute to resolve the problem of urban terror. Their views are based on the following:

- an increase in visible policing;
- acts of urban terror and related crimes reduced; and
- the number of arrests increased.

However, their general responses are that Operation Good - Hope addressed the bomb threats but not the causes of it.

#### **4.2.5. General observation of participants**

The following are the responses of interviewees and participants in the focus group discussions, about Operation Good - Hope:

- The head of Operation Good - Hope was approached by the Western Cape Anti Crime Forum (WCACF) to help with social crime prevention programmes. This initiative failed due to a lack of interest from Operation Good - Hope;
- The Western Cape Provincial Government did not have a holistic plan in place to deal with serious violent crimes;
- The presence of Operation Good - Hope disempowered police stations;
- The SAPS knows the principles of joint operations, but not joint management;
- Operation Good - Hope's management did not understand the culture of PAGAD, gangs and bomb threats;
- Operation Good - Hope did not create the mechanism for its various units (stakeholders) to jointly cooperate;



- Operation Good - Hope created a police versus PAGAD situation – a circle of violence of which the SAPS was a part, i.e. PAGAD do one thing and the SAPS responded, the SAPS do another thing and PAGAD responded. Therefore, there was no intervention of communication between the SAPS and PAGAD to break the cycle of violence. Communities became the spectators;
- Operation Good - Hope undermined the concept of community policing;
- Operation Good - Hope created the impression that it tolerated the acts of vigilantes to such an extent that the arrest of PAGAD members start to become a threat to the SAPS and the internal security and stability of the Western Cape. The argument here is that it almost becomes advisable for the SAPS not to arrest PAGAD members, because the community started to condone PAGAD activities. This also indicates the lack of proper analysis and the one - dimensional approach to policing;
- Operation Good - Hope proved that the SAPS is not in a position to resolve the problem of crime and violence on its own;
- The management of Operation Good - Hope failed to anticipate who should be the strategic team to secure representivity in relation to the type of community it have to served;
- The management of Operation Good - Hope rejected an offer of Islamic academics who were prepared to explain Islamic issues related to PAGAD; and
- Operation Good - Hope, indirectly mislead the community by putting the blame on PAGAD for every incident of bomb blasts, without proper analysis and investigation.

### **4.3. SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS**

The aforementioned analysis indicated that all the participants understood that the purpose of Operation Good - Hope was to address a specific serious violent crime tendency, namely urban terror, and to police the causes of urban terror.

The data results indicate that there was a working - relationship between the various SAPS components in Operation Good - Hope, but it was not properly managed and coordinated. The data results also indicates that Operation Good - Hope did not allow for external collaboration with relevant stakeholders and showed no sense of partnership.

The results also indicate that Operation Good - Hope did not address social crime problems. Its only focus was to arrest and convict the perpetrators of urban terror and related crimes.

The study results confirmed that the objectives of Operation Good - Hope were not shaped by a clear analysis and cohesive strategy. It also confirmed the lack of communication, community participation, and a lack of participation with external security agencies and NGO's.

The results of the data confirms the following statements of the researcher as discussed in chapter 1:

- i. No effective relationship was established in Operation Good - Hope both internally and externally, as a strategic integrated approach to deal with crime and violence.
- ii. Operation Good - Hope's approach to policing serious violent crimes was reactive and one-dimensional.
- iii. The purpose and operational planning of Operation Good - Hope, did not function as an integrated model to accommodate



the principles of the building blocks of development in pursuing the ideals of the White Paper on Safety and Security, i.e. enhancing partnership policing with NGO's, community anti - crime structures, neighbourhood watches, community police forums and other government departments.

- iv. Although there was a working - relationship between inter - SAPS components and the SANDF, they failed to understand how their integrated tasks/ roles should supplement each other.

The findings of this study confirms the research hypothesis, namely, **“that an integrated development approach will be more successful in preventing crime and violence then heterogeneous police tasks teams and operations”**.

Despite the acceptance of the above hypothesis, 18% of the interviewees indicated that an integrated development approach should be implemented amongst internal SAPS components and on an ad - hoc basis with external stakeholders. The 82% of the interviewees indicated that the integrated development approach to crime prevention should be a permanent initiative where the relevant stakeholders (i.e. necessary government departments, NGO's, community and businesses) can jointly contribute to the development of a cohesive strategy and the implementation of it.

The researcher holds the view that the aforementioned two views on how the integrated development approach should be applied to crime prevention, can be merged into one collaborative strategy to secure a sustainable approach to police serious violent crimes.

The final chapter will deal with recommendations that could attribute to an integrated development approach to police serious violent crimes.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION**

#### **5.1. INTRODUCTION**

The proceeding chapters indicated that an integrated development approach is a condition to successfully stabilise and normalise crime and violence. What is needed is a process through which crime control can lead to a participatory crime prevention strategy. The Operation Good - Hope case study has proved that participation and partnership was not entrenched in crime prevention processes. The selected examples of a partnership approach in Britain and Cucas (see chapter 2) has proved that an integrated development approach can lead to the integration of different skills and expertise, capacity building and the empowerment of stakeholders.

#### **5.2. EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY**

In chapter 1 the researcher dealt with the research problem which leads to a hypothesis, with two variables, i.e. an independent and a dependent variable. Key concepts were defined and discussed to indicate their conceptual relationship. Implications and limitations to the study were also discussed.

In chapter 2 the researcher dealt with a theoretical discussion on the integrated development approach. In chapter 3 and 4 the study site, Operation Good - Hope and the study results have been discussed and related to the theories on the integrated development approach in chapter 2. The particular process in chapter 3 and 4 was followed in order to test the research hypothesis.



The findings of the study showed that Operation Good - Hope struggled to successfully address the problem of serious violent crimes, i.e. urban terror and related crimes and failed to entrench partnership policing. This chapter will focus on policy recommendations as an alternative approach to operations, like Operation Good - Hope.

### **5.3. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS**

The recommendations are done in two parts, A and B. The reason for a two parts recommendation, is due to the fact that during Operation Good - Hope, crime at police stations (grassroots level) had increased with 55,24%. It is an indication that while almost all policing attention was focused at Operation Good - Hope, normal policing was neglected.

Recommendation A will look at an integrated approach to crime prevention at a local government/ metropolitan level. Recommendation B will look at an integrated approach to serious violent crimes at a provincial level (those are the type of crimes that need an intervention from a higher level of government). The two approaches will secure a continuous normalisation of policing, and at the same time have special intervention to stabilise serious violent crimes.

#### **5.3.1. Recommendations A**

The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs in Theron (2000), define community development as, “The participation of the people themselves in efforts to improve their level of living, with as much reliance as possible on their own initiatives, and the provision of technical and other services in ways which encourage initiative, self - help and mutual help and make these more effective”. Crime prevention at a community level is a social

learning process through which people participate to reach self - reliance, and collective participation for self - empowerment.


Taking the White Paper on Safety and Security (1998), The SAPS Amendment Bill No 39 of 1998, the White Paper on Local Government (1998), the Local Government Transition Act (1993) and the Development Facilitation Act (1995), as point of departure, the following are recommended to develop a local - based strategy for crime prevention:

- Local governments should take the lead in facilitating collective partnerships with relevant stakeholders at community level. This collective partnership can manifest itself in the form of a local crime prevention partnership, that will include the following stakeholders; municipal police, police stations, religious groups, community police forums, local NGO's, neighborhood watches, offices of Provincial Government located at local level and businesses.
- Local government must re - integrate and align its functions to the principles of crime prevention and community policing.
- Local government should build on existing municipal policing, i.e. enforcing municipal by - laws and increasing visible policing, joint operations, patrols and searches with police stations, and laws on liquor permits, etc.
- Local government together with local business should fund crime prevention projects involving communities, i.e. programmes for victims of crime, control the sale of drugs and alcohol to children and the youth; programmes to reduce gun ownership and illegal firearm trade, develop job creation programmes, skills and expertise training for neighborhood watches, etc.
- Local community police forums, schools, religious bodies and NGO's can plan and implement social crime prevention programmes.



Figure 4 illustrate four approaches to crime prevention used together to eradicate a single problem. The researcher adapted figure 4 from A manual for Community Based Crime Prevention (Centre for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 2000).

**Figure 4:** *A local - based crime prevention model*



The following explains the advantages and disadvantages of a local - based strategy for crime prevention:

➤ Advantages

- working in partnership entrench skills and expertise;
- it develops self-empowerment and self - reliance;
- the resources and skills are used in a community in such a way that all partners benefit and crime will be reduced;
- responsive to local needs;
- reduce the work load of police stations;
- it can align crime prevention projects within a manageable number of policing areas; and
- crime prevention can be aligned with local government delivery and planning.

➤ Disadvantages

- police stations have limited powers to make decisions towards enhancing local partnership;
- poor access to provincial government; and
- neighborhood watches and reservists have limited powers to arrest.

### **5.3.2. Recommendations B**

The National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) (1996) is based on the assumptions that the SAPS cannot reduce crime and violence alone. Without the involvement of the community and of government departments other than the SAPS, it will be difficult to reduce crime and violence. The research results indicated that a collaborative intervention from a higher level other than the local is necessary to reduce serious violent crimes.



Based on the key principles of the NCPS (1996), the White Paper on Safety and Security (1998) and the White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery (1997), the following is recommended to develop a provincial framework for an integrated development approach to police serious violent crimes:

- A problem orientated approach to policing (POP) in order to: -
  - evaluate underlying factors that account for the repetitious nature of crime incidents;
  - evaluate problems and underlying causes of problems;
  - evaluate the options for partnership approach to police crime and violence; and
  - create a collaborative response rather than a unilateral police response to crime and violence.
- Establish partnerships in which business, community based organisations, non governmental organisations, academic institutions and government departments can play a part, i.e.
  - business can help funding the publication of survey standards or a telephone help line, or sponsor a customer survey;
  - offer secondments and exchanges to public servants (in particular the SAPS) to broaden experiences;
  - NGO's and CBO's can help spread information about what services are available and where to obtain them; and
  - academic institutions can help to conduct comparative studies on international best practices in police service improvements.
- The concept of community policing be enhanced within a provincial partnership approach to crime prevention.
- Analyse skills audits before any kind of operation are initiated, to determine its capacity to integrated policing.
- Decision - making powers for the managing and coordination of crime prevention strategies, as in the form of Operation Good – Hope, be


decentralised to the level where the problem occur and implementation be coordinated.

- The aforementioned recommendations be structured in a formal partnership to ensure the sustainability of crime prevention strategies, i.e. Multi - Agency Delivery Action Mechanism (MADAM) or the Provincial NCPS Office.

Figure 5 illustrates a structured integrated approach to policing serious violent crimes in the Western Cape.



**Figure 5:** *A Provincial framework for an integrated development approach to police serious violent crimes*



The following explains the advantages and disadvantages of a provincial framework for an integrated development approach to police serious violent crimes:

➤ Advantages

- it entrenches a partnership approach to the problem of serious violent crime;
- strategies and implementation are coordinated and supervised;
- help with crime combating interventions to supplement local policing initiatives;
- it brings together all relevant stakeholders to participate;
- have access to decision - makers;
- have access to provincial departments; and
- have access to local policing structures.

➤ Disadvantages

- selection of projects might not reflect priorities of affected local communities; and
- limited access to local government delivery.

The following recommendations are supplementary to both recommendation A and B:

- Crime prevention solutions must be based on factors that cause crime, i.e. victims, offenders, the environment and places where crimes take place.
- A crime prevention strategy be designed and implemented into the following phases:

Phase 1:           A safety audit/ profile to identify problems and understand the community.



- |          |                                   |
|----------|-----------------------------------|
| Phase 2: | Develop a strategy                |
| Phase 3: | Manage and implement the strategy |
| Phase 4: | Monitor and evaluate the strategy |

The study results (see chapter 4) confirms that Operation Good – Hope’s approach to policing serious violent crimes was reactive. Reactive posture encourages responses of “getting there” and on “getting out” than on what actually happens in handling of the incident (Goldstein, 1990: 20). The study results (see chapter 4) also confirms that Operation Good – Hope in the handling of the urban terror incidents did not get involved in explaining the factors that contributed to it.

Based on the aforementioned study results, the following are recommended:

- More time should be made available for proactive policing. A primary focus of policing should be on the maximum deployment of visible policing into areas affected by serious violent crimes. The more the SAPS can deploy visible police, the more it will prevent crime from happening.
- The underlying problem of crime should be addressed directly rather than dealing repeatedly with the symptoms of that problem. This can improved the effectiveness of the police in responding to citizen’s concerns.
- Future policing strategies needs to be part of a coherent plan and be comparable to the changes in the environment. The SAPS should also be able to assess and evaluate what the implications of this coherent plan will have for it’s organisation. A coherent plan will prevent incidents from been handled as isolated and self – contained.

The aforementioned policy recommendations are summarised as follows:

- i. Develop a local - based strategy for crime prevention lead by local government.
- ii. Develop a provincial framework for an integrated development approach to police serious violent crimes.
- iii. Crime prevention solutions must be based on factors that cause crime.
- iv. A crime prevention strategy be designed and implemented.
- v. A proactive style of policing.
- vi. Directly addressed the underlying problems of crime.
- vii. Policing strategies should be based on a coherent plan.

Both recommendations A and B are dependent on each other.

Recommendations B is responsible for crime combating intervention – it will play a supplementary role to help local policing with crime and violence occurrence above their control.

In chapter 1 the researcher identified the following as limitations:

- Unsuccessful appointment with respondents;
- It took a long process to set - up meetings with interviewees; and
- Formal focus group discussions did not materialise due to participants fearing exposure of their identity and safety.

Based on the aforementioned limitations, the researcher make the following recommendations to assist future researchers who might experience the same problems:

- The researcher in conjunction with his/ her supervisor should make a written request to potential participants explaining the importance of the study; and
- To avoid exposing the identity of participants (through focus group discussions). The researcher can consider the option of gathering the



relevant data through attending for example, community meetings – and or workshops as a participant, observer or facilitator.

## 5.4. CONCLUSION

The study investigates if an integrated development approach is more successful in preventing crime and violence than heterogeneous police task teams and operations, with Operation Good - Hope as a case study. This study was an attempt to determine whether it is necessary to provide an alternative to the current method of policing serious violent crimes in the Western Cape.

To support the investigations, theories on integrated development approaches were discussed and related to the data analysis and research findings. The instruments that were used to collect, describe and analyse the data were designed in such a way that it endeavoured to indicate how participants felt about Operation Good - Hope. The instruments used to analyse the data assisted the researcher with the research findings (see chapter 4).

The researcher hopes that this study would answer some of the concerns and questions that many people had about crime prevention approaches to serious violent crimes. The researcher hopes that this study is going to stimulate researchers to investigate further:

- Whether there is a failure of public officials to correctly interpret government policies and whether there is a lack of management capacity to implement these policies?
- Whether the SAPS specialised units are not disempowering local policing?
- If community policing is failing and why?
- The need to give community police forums governing powers over matters of local policing.

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### **7.1. Formal structured thumb – press interview**



## PERCEPTIONS

1. How did you interpret the purpose of Operation Good - Hope?

.....  
 .....

2. Describe your understanding of the structure of Operation Good - Hope and who were the key role - players involved?

.....  
 .....

3. How did you see the intention of Operation Good - Hope?

.....  
 .....

4. What do you think are the main barriers in operations like Operation Good - Hope?

.....  
 .....

5. Why do you think Operation Good - Hope close down?

.....  
 .....

6. Are you aware of any environmental influences that contributed to the closing down of Operation Good - Hope?

Yes	1
No	2

Explain

.....

7. Were parts of Operation Good - Hope to look or also address the social crime issues?

Yes	1
No	2

Explain

.....

**Perceptions**

8. Can you think of any current initiatives, objectives or service that the police should reinforce or scrap?

Yes	1
No	2

Explain  
.....

9. If you think of Operation Good - Hope, did it address the continuous problems of serious violent crimes in the Western Cape?

Yes	1
No	2

Explain  
.....

**Perceptions  
continue**



**LIAISONS/ RELATIONS**

1. Apart from Operation Good - Hope, are you aware of any other agencies (during the period of the operation) that addressed crime prevention both inside and outside the police?

.....  
.....

2. Was there any working relationship with those agencies? Can you explain the kind of working relationship?

.....  
.....

3. To what extent was partnership prioritised and enhanced in aspect of crime prevention?

Internally	1
Externally	2

4. Do you think there were any form of implementation initiatives that encourages shared responsibility, collective priority and co - operation in order to deliver a better and more holistic service?

Yes	1
No	2

Explain

.....

5. Are you aware of any form of communication feedback done to communities regarding your crime prevention activities, so that they can also contribute towards it?

Yes	1
No	2

Explain

.....

**Relations**

**TECHNICAL SKILLS**

1. In relation to the SAPS (as the broader organisation), what were the unique expertise and skills in Operation Good - Hope?

Expertise	1
Skills	2

2. Do you think Operation Good - Hope was a duplicative function to existing police functions?

.....

.....

3. Do you think the detectives with the community/ community agencies had to rely on their own investigation abilities in order to solve problems?

Yes	1
No	2

Explain

.....

4. Do you think there are any new initiatives, objectives or service that the police should undertake in order to promote joint (integrated) responsibility to crime prevention?

Yes	1
No	2

Explain

.....



EVALUATION

1. Do you think it is possible to demonstrate visible achievement or success rates of Operation Good - Hope? What are they? How does it compare with the success rate of normal policing?

.....  
.....

- 2.1. Did Operation Good - Hope set objectives?

Yes	1
No	2

- 2.2. Did the objectives met the requirements of the community?

Yes	1
No	2

- 2.3. Did Operation Good - Hope review progress on a regular basis?

Yes	1
No	2

- 2.4. Were the progresses measured?

Yes	1
No	2

Explain

.....

3. Do you think the operation's objectives were adaptive to the changes in the environment?

.....  
.....

4. Do you think the various functioning of Operation Good - Hope's activities were integrated?

Yes	1
No	2

Explain

.....

5. To what extend do you think did the rendering of services provided by Operation Good - Hope enable people to help themselves?

.....

.....

6. Do you think resources and responsibilities were allocated well?

Yes	1
No	2

Explain

.....

7. Which of the following types of policing styles were used to police violent crimes during Operation Good - Hope? Was it an incident style or problem orientated style?

Incident style	1
Problem orientated style	2

8. Would you say there was a balanced approach to practice and actions throughout Operation Good - Hope's strategies?

Yes	1
No	2

Explain

.....



9. Do you think the operations addressed specific needs and or contributed to the solutions of specific problems being experienced?

Yes	1
No	2

Explain

.....

10. Was any form of crime analysis done in order to determine the exact nature of crime problems being experienced by the community?

Yes	1
No	2

Explain

.....

## **7.2. Cape Argus publication of Operation Good – Hope**



# Pagad cops get the boot

## *Daniels heads new operation*

EPH ARANES  
F REPORTER

A police unit investigating Pagad-related offences will be disbanded in the next few days, when West Metropolitan Police Commissioner Ganief Daniels takes over the new Operation Good Hope. Commissioner George Fivaz yesterday announced the new police strategy, to be coordinated at a national level, to fight urban terrorism in the Western Cape.

Operation Good Hope will mean extra police, money and equipment being poured into the province at a cost of around R3-million a month.

It kicked off with the deployment of more police at the V&A Waterfront yesterday, and the order to police units throughout the province to supply reinforcements.

Commissioner Fivaz said police legal advisers were also examining extraordinary powers legislation against urban terrorism that might include the banning of certain non-political organisations. "We really want to get this thing under control," he said.

Last night he phoned Commissioner



New order: Ganief Daniels, left, and George Fivaz

Daniels to give him the news that he would head the operation.

Commissioner Daniels said although he was waiting for a full briefing, one of his first tasks would be to disband the present Pagad task team, as it was clear that the unit had not come to grips with the situation during more than two years of operation.

"We will look at a totally new approach with more resources, both personnel and

material, to fight this scourge of urban terrorism and crime."

"People's confidence in the police is low and now that there is a clear political will - from Deputy President Thabo Mbeki and Safety and Security Minister Sydney Mufamadi, and from the side of the police - we must make a success of this latest approach to combat crime in the province."

Commissioner Daniels said he would assemble another team of hand-picked detectives to probe various allegations and to investigate the pile of unsolved crimes.

"Some of the present investigators will come on board, but we will also use the expertise made available by the national office. More emphasis will be placed on the use of crime intelligence."


The commissioner said Operation Good Hope was an opportunity to prove black officers could be successful in fighting crime.

Mr Fivaz said a crime summit, similar to the farmers' summit on security, would be held with various community leaders and roleplayers in the province to help fine-tune the operation and to get their support for the new initiative.

### **7.3. Structure of Operation Good – Hope**



# OPERATION GOOD HOPE



#### **7.4. Comparative statistics: Selected crimes per area: Western Cape**



**COMPARITIVE STATISTICS : SELECTED CRIMES PER AREA : WESTERN CAPE**

Period : 01 January 1998 to 31 December 1999 \* compared to the period 01 January 1996 to 31 December 1997 \*\*

**BOLAND**

SELECTED CRIMES	1996	1997	TOTAL	1998	1999	TOTAL	% DIFF
1 ARMED ROBBERY WITH FIRE-ARM	66	168	234	290	302	592	152.99
2 THEFT OFF/FROM /OFF MOTOR VEHICLE	1543	4538	6181	5528	7017	12545	120.76
3 BURGLARIES AND ATTEMPTED HOUSES	3408	8390	11798	10367	12835	23202	100.90
4 ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION	111	207	318	334	295	629	97.80
5 ROBBERY OTHER	483	1009	1492	1330	1601	2931	96.45
6 THEFT OTHER	6037	14511	20548	16994	22017	37001	80.07
7 BURGLARY AND ATTEMPTED EXCLUDING RESIDENTIAL	1661	4161	5822	4961	5351	10312	77.12
8 ROBBERY AGGRAVATED CIRCUMSTANCES - NO FIREARMS	143	248	391	343	344	687	75.70
9 ATTEMPTED MURDER	231	521	752	648	548	1296	72.34
10 DRUG RELATED CRIME	1287	3753	5040	3689	3784	7473	52.24
11 MURDER	393	839	1232	942	523	1465	51.38

**EAST METROPOL**

SELECTED CRIMES	1996	1997	TOTAL	1998	1999	TOTAL	% DIFF
1 ARMED ROBBERY WITH FIRE-ARM	433	1261	1694	2021	2212	4233	151.37
2 THEFT OFF/FROM /OFF MOTOR VEHICLE	3119	3196	11315	11235	11919	23158	104.67
3 ROBBERY OTHER	840	2148	2988	2547	3053	5900	97.46
4 ROBBERY AGGRAVATED CIRCUMSTANCES - NO FIREARMS	287	577	864	824	789	1613	86.69
5 THEFT OTHER	7542	19070	26612	22470	25558	48028	80.47
6 ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION	208	843	1051	821	807	1628	68.20
7 BURGLARIES AND ATTEMPTED HOUSES	4084	11575	15659	13397	12616	26016	66.14
8 DRUG RELATED CRIME	584	2218	2780	2152	2383	4541	63.35
9 ATTEMPTED MURDER	462	1364	1826	1642	1314	2956	61.88
10 BURGLARY AND ATTEMPTED EXCLUDING RESIDENTIAL	1488	4124	5582	4510	4165	8775	57.20
11 MURDER	487	1016	1503	1194	1082	2276	51.43

**SOUTHERN CAPE**

SELECTED CRIMES	1996	1997	TOTAL	1998	1999	TOTAL	% DIFF
1 THEFT OFF/FROM /OFF MOTOR VEHICLE	488	1162	1647	1695	2380	4079	147.66
2 ARMED ROBBERY WITH FIRE-ARM	18	81	70	82	77	169	141.43
3 ROBBERY OTHER	221	503	724	665	908	1570	116.85
4 BURGLARY AND ATTEMPTED EXCLUDING RESIDENTIAL	692	1773	2465	2545	2459	5118	107.63
5 BURGLARIES AND ATTEMPTED HOUSES	1544	3790	5434	4545	5755	10305	89.64
6 THEFT OTHER	2903	6881	9584	7689	9355	17024	77.63
7 ATTEMPTED MURDER	100	193	299	245	273	528	76.59
8 ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION	30	90	120	82	127	209	74.17
9 ROBBERY AGGRAVATED CIRCUMSTANCES - NO FIREARMS	104	132	236	181	189	380	61.00
10 MURDER	177	384	561	418	405	822	46.52
11 DRUG RELATED CRIME	496	1482	1978	1210	1507	2747	38.88

**WEST METROPOL**

SELECTED CRIMES	1996	1997	TOTAL	1998	1999	TOTAL	% DIFF
1 ARMED ROBBERY WITH FIRE-ARM	544	1754	2298	2651	3075	5729	149.30
2 ROBBERY OTHER	1269	3465	4735	5057	5833	10690	125.77
3 THEFT OTHER	8314	22381	30695	27738	30884	58620	90.95
4 ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION	235	773	1008	933	925	1858	84.33
5 THEFT OFF/FROM /OFF MOTOR VEHICLE	7741	23413	31154	29623	26946	56574	81.59
6 ROBBERY AGGRAVATED CIRCUMSTANCES - NO FIREARMS	352	795	1147	989	1055	2044	78.20
7 DRUG RELATED CRIME	1002	3326	4328	3161	4226	7387	70.68
8 BURGLARIES AND ATTEMPTED HOUSES	5219	15420	20639	16451	15885	32336	56.67
9 MURDER	467	885	1352	1077	997	2074	53.40
10 ATTEMPTED MURDER	595	1499	2094	1745	1464	3209	53.25
11 BURGLARY AND ATTEMPTED EXCLUDING RESIDENTIAL	2236	5742	8026	5772	5029	10801	34.54

\* Operation Good Hope Phase

\*\* With Operation Good Hope Phase

## **7.5. Statistics on urban terror and gang related crimes**



Figure 3: Trends in urban terror and gang-related violence, 1998-1999





Figure 4: Urban terror incidents, 1998-1999



## **7.6. Cape Times publication on Operation Good - Hope**



Cape Times: 1999/01/29

# 667 attacks: Not one conviction

WILLEM STEENKAMP

AT least 667 attacks that police allege were gang- or terror-related — including pipe-bombings, petrol-bombings and drive-by shootings — were perpetrated in the city last year. A total of 163 arrests — of 28 Pagad members and 140 alleged gangsters — have been made, but so far no one has been convicted of any crime.

There have been several violent incidents in the city this year, two of them bombings — the New Year's Day blast at the Waterfront and yesterday's in the CBD.

Among the notable incidents over the past year, which showed a growing shift in the pattern of attacks away from gangsters and towards businesspeople and the police, are the following:

- About 3.30pm on January 25 a pipe bomb exploded in the Lansdowne police station. It smashed furniture, shattered windows and blew a hole in the ceiling.

In what was described as "a miracle" the three policemen on duty at the time escaped serious injury.

Moments later one of the policemen, with the help of a quick-thinking motorist, arrested two Surrey Estate men trying to flee the scene.

- On February 19 the Rondebosch East home of then-president of the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC), Sheikh Nazim Mohamed, was damaged in a hand-grenade attack.

MJC secretary Achmat Sedick said at the time that while it was "dangerous" to speculate on who was responsible, the MJC did not believe gangsters were involved.

President Nelson Mandela labelled the attack "a tragedy" and Islamic Unity Convention (IUC) deputy chairperson Ganiet Hendricks said it was "a blot on the Muslim community".

- There was a series of pipe- and petrol-bombings on the night of April 27, following two incidents earlier in the day when Pagad supporters clashed with gangsters in Lost City, Mitchells Plain. A boy was killed and four others wounded in two shootings.

Two people were killed and another injured in the three pipe-bombings and two petrol-bombings that night, in Athlone, Salt River, Bonteheuwel and Grassy Park.

- On May 28 pipe-bombs were thrown at the homes of wealthy businessman Zhaun Ahmed in Lansdowne and the manager of the Woodstock St Elmo's Pizzeria in Walmer Estate. There were no injuries in either attack, but Ahmed's blue Rolls Royce was destroyed and the large front window of the manager's home was shattered and a car damaged.

- Police first used the term "urban terror" on June 10, when three pipe bombs and a remote-controlled car bomb — the first to have been used in the violence in the Peninsula — exploded in



**AFTERMATH:** The bomb was placed in a bin next to a green Volkswagen Beetle in front of Cape Town Central police station. Glass and shrapnel snowed the area 50m around the blast. **PICTURE: MUJAHID SAFODIEN**

Athlone. All of the targets were leading businessmen in the Muslim and Indian communities.

Police, saying that the attacks were "definitely not by the gangs", revealed that the victims and other businesspeople, about 30 in all, had been targeted for extortion in the preceding two weeks.

Police also claimed that a shadowy, hand-picked group within Pagad's armed wing, the G-Force, was responsible for these and eight other attacks — but Pagad national co-ordinator Abdoes-Salaam Ebrahim denied this.

- On June 18 the Lotus River house of left-wing politician and academic Neville Alexander was petrol-bombed. Alexander, his sister and his four children, who were home at the time, were not hurt.

However, police later said they believed the attacker had mistaken his home for that of a drug and liquor dealer in the same street — but his house was petrol-bombed again on July 2.

- On June 21 a business in Grassy Park belonging to the owner of the firm targeted by the car bomb 11 days earlier in Athlone was extensively damaged by a pipe bomb. A man was severely injured.

- About 1am on June 26 a second police station was bombed, this time in Mowbray, causing extensive damage to the pavement and a car, and blowing out nearby shop windows.

Witnesses said the occupants of a white Corolla had thrown "a package" at the police station before speeding off.

- On July 3 the Rondebosch East home of prominent religious studies academic Ebrahim Moosa was rocked by a powerful pipe bomb. No one was injured, but sev-

eral houses were damaged.

Moosa, who has since left the country, was one of the first to criticise Pagad's "militancy and intolerance" when he and other prominent leaders and groups, including the MJC, ANC provincial leader Ebrahim Rasool, Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town Njongonkulu Ndungane and others issued a joint statement in November 1996.

- On July 30 two Pagad members, Faizel Hendricks and Nurulla Allie, were blown to pieces and two others, Mogamat Anwar Francis and Yusuf Salie, injured when a pipe bomb exploded inside the cab of their bakkie in Wetton.

Pagad claimed at the time that gangsters had thrown the bomb into the bakkie, but police — labelling the men "high-profile G-Force members" — said this was "nonsense" and that they had been on their way to attack a target when the bomb exploded prematurely.

- The third attack on a police target came on August 6, when hawker Nolusindiso Mlole was killed and shop assistant Karen le Roux seriously injured in a pipe-bombing outside the Bellville offices of the Pagad Task Team. Two passersby were also hurt.

A few days later police and political, religious, anti-crime and union leaders gathered for a wreath-laying ceremony at the spot where Mlole, who had virtually been standing over the bomb when it exploded, was killed. They declared themselves united against the " scourge of terrorism".

- On August 25 the pipe bomb

that drew international attention — at the Planet Hollywood restaurant in the V&A Waterfront — went off, killing two and injuring 26 others.

It was also the first major "soft" target, striking at the heart of the city's most popular tourist attraction, and in a venue owned by major Hollywood stars Arnold Schwarzenegger, Bruce Willis, Sylvester Stallone and Demi Moore.

Speculation was rife that the bombing was in response to US missile attacks against alleged "terrorist" targets in Sudan and Afghanistan.

- Bombings tailed off after the Planet Hollywood blast, but on October 26 a bomb went off at the entrance to Club Images in Athlone. There were no injuries, but the entrance to the club was badly damaged.

- Early on December 18, a pipe bomb exploded at the entrance to the 96-year-old Wynberg synagogue, ripping doors off hinges, chipping plaster and smashing stained-glass windows. No one was hurt.

- Five bombings and petrol-bombings were reported on Christmas Day, in areas such as Retreat, Eerste River, Lansdowne, Sherwood Park in Manenberg and Cravenburg Estate. Two people were hurt in the Manenberg incident.

- The first bombing of the New Year, and the second car bomb to be exploded, was outside the Victoria Wharf at the Waterfront on New Year's Day. Two people were hurt.

*There is a shift in pattern away from alleged gangsters and towards business people and police.*



## ABSTRACT

This study was embarked upon to identify an alternative approach to policing. It was an attempt to investigate whether an integrated development approach will be more successful in preventing crime and violence than heterogeneous police task teams and operations. Operation Good - Hope in the Western Cape, a SAPS crime prevention strategy to police the urban terror and related crimes (PAGAD and gang violence), was the focus of the study.

Plurality of research methodology was introduced to compile data. The data collected was analysed in relation to the topic and the objective of the study and to the research hypothesis.

Based on the data analysis the following are the main research findings:

- a working relationship existed between various SAPS components within Operation Good - Hope, but was not properly managed and coordinated;
- Operation Good - Hope did not allowed for external collaboration with relevant stakeholders and showed no sense of partnership;
- Operation Good - Hope did not police the social crime problems; and
- Operation Good - Hope was not shaped by a clear analysis and cohesive strategy.

The findings of the study gave rise to the following recommendations:

- That a local - based strategy for crime prevention be develop and lead by local government to normalise crime and violence;